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The lack of kidneys available for transplantation results in thousands of deaths 
every year. A regulated market for kidneys from living suppliers might solve this 
problem. Yet such a market is widely opposed based on the argument that it necessarily 
entails immoral acts. This thesis examines this argument by evaluating the necessary acts 
involved in a regulated living kidney market using four ethical frameworks—namely, 
utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and principlism. I conclude that the argument 
is unfounded. The objections against an organ market are either ineffective, 
misinterpreting the regulated organ market or the demands of the ethical frameworks, or 
overly broad, condemning every type of organ transplantation from the living. 
Furthermore, I argue that the prohibition of a regulated living kidney market is unjustified 
within these frameworks. Finally, I discuss the practical aspects of the question, arguing 
for the necessity of the basic regulation for ensuring informed consent and showing that 














Every year, many patients who wait for an organ transplant are removed 
from the waiting list because they become too sick to survive the procedure, or 
because they die while waiting for a donor. In 2011 alone, there were 10,795 such 
patients in the United States,1 9,936 of whom were waiting for a kidney or liver 
transplant.2 Since 1995, the number of patients who have been waiting for a 
kidney or liver transplant and had to be removed from the U.S. waiting list for 
being “too sick to transplant” is 29,535, while the number of removals due to 
death is 88,517.3 In the United States, every day approximately 30 people waiting 
for an organ transplant die or are informed that they will die since they are too 
sick to survive the transplant surgery.4 Out of these patients, around 19 are kidney 
patients and almost 8 are liver patients.5 
These saddening numbers are the outcome of a severe imbalance between 
the need for organ transplants and the available supply. Had they received an 
organ in time, these patients would almost certainly have survived, as organ 
                                                 
1 Calculation based on the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network’s (OPTN) table for 
“Removal Reasons by Year” for all candidates, last modified March 30, 2012,  
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp. 
2 Calculation based on OPTN’s tables for “Removal Reasons by Year” for kidney candidates and 
liver candidates. 
3Ibid. 
4 Calculation based on OPTN’s tables for “Removal Reasons by Year” for all candidates. 





transplantation now achieves survival rates of 95.9% from deceased donors and 
98.5% from living donors for kidney transplants and 87.8% from deceased donors 
and 91.7% from living donors for liver transplants.6 In the United States, there are 
currently 113,771 patients waiting for single or multiple organ transplants, 91,714 
of whom are waiting for a kidney.7 By contrast, in 2011, there were only 14,146 
donors and a total of 28,535 transplants performed in the United States,8 out of 
which only 16,812 were kidney transplants.9 Numbers for most other countries 
are not more encouraging.10 This imbalance causes many patients to spend years 
on the waiting list. Their conditions decidedly worsen during this waiting period 
and make them ineligible even if an organ finally becomes available. While 
patients who are waiting for heart, lung, pancreas, or intestine transplants almost 
completely depend on donations from deceased donors, patients who wait for 
kidney and liver transplants have the chance to receive a kidney or a partial liver 
from a living donor, which also results in better survival outcomes than 
transplants from deceased donors. Yet, the current system of organ donation fails 
to meet the needs of the patients whose lives depend on transplant surgery.  
                                                 
6 Calculation based on 2004–2008 survival rates for kidney and liver transplants from the 
OPTN/SRTR Annual Report, table for “One Year Adjusted Patient Survival by Organ and Year of 
Transplant, 1999 to 2008,” accessed April 9, 2012, 
 http://www.srtr.org/annual_reports/2010/112a_dh.htm. 
7 “Waiting List Candidates,” OPTN, accessed April 9, 2012, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/. 
8 “Transplants performed January – December 2011” and “Donors recovered January – December 
2011,” OPTN, accessed April 9, 2012, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/data/. 
9 “Transplants by Donor Type” for kidney, OPTN, last modified March 30, 2012, 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/step2.asp. 
10 For example, by the end of 2007, 58,182 patients were on the waiting list for organ transplants 
in the European Union and only 25,932 transplants were performed during the same year. See 
Council of Europe, Trafficking in Organs, Tissues and Cells and Trafficking in Human Beings for 





Adopting a market system for organs from the living, especially for 
kidneys, is a potential solution to the problem of not having enough organs 
available for transplant.11 By providing incentives, a kidney market is likely to 
motivate more individuals to provide their organs and increase the number of 
available organs significantly. However, from policy makers to medical 
professionals and academics, many strongly argue against an organ market. 
Many, if not most, opponents of organ market base their view on ethical grounds. 
They argue that introducing financial incentives to the system of organ 
transplantation causes severe ethical problems. 
An example of such a claim can be found in the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ 
Transplantation. In this guideline, the WHO takes a firm position against an organ 
market for the reason that “[p]ayment for cells, tissues and organs is likely to take 
unfair advantage of the poorest and most vulnerable groups, undermines altruistic 
donation, and leads to profiteering and human trafficking. Such payment conveys 
the idea that some persons lack dignity, that they are mere objects to be used by 
others.”12 In other words, this claim suggests, an organ market necessarily entails 
immoral actions. The statement clearly refers to the Kantian idea of human 
dignity and the moral duty for not treating others as a mere means. However, the 
WHO’s statement, as well as the vast majority of such comments, does not 
                                                 
11 Gary S. Becker and Julio Jorge Elias, “Introducing Incentives in the Market for Live and 
Cadaveric Organ Donations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (2007): 3–24; Andrew 
V. Scott and Walter E. Block, “Organ Transplant: Using the Free Market Solves the Problem,” 
Journal of Clinical Research & Bioethics 2, issue 3 (2011), doi:10.4172/2155-9627.1000111. 
12 “WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation.” World Health 





furnish a clear, full analysis to support this ethical claim. As I shall argue in this 
thesis, this deficient analysis leads to an erroneous conclusion that costs thousands 
of lives every year. 
In this thesis, I fill this major gap for a coherent and comprehensive ethical 
analysis of an organ market from the living. The paradigm case that I consider is a 
regulated market for kidneys; however, I mostly use the generic term organ 
market to indicate that the analysis would also hold for other non-vital organs, 
such as the liver, that can be transplanted from living donors without causing 
significant harm to the supplier. I evaluate the claim that an organ market 
necessarily leads to immoral actions within the frameworks of the three major 
ethical theories—namely, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and virtue ethics—and a 
cornerstone bioethical theory—namely, principlism. I look at each ethical theory 
in depth and analyze how a regulated organ market and the actions that it entails 
fit into these frameworks. I argue that a regulated market can and plausibly will 
involve morally permissible actions regardless of which theoretical perspective is 
adopted to evaluate them. None of these theories, I claim, opposes a regulated 
organ market. In fact, I find that all four theories provide grounds for an argument 
against a prohibition of the market. No justification for a prohibition can be found 
in any of the theories, and, moreover, three of them—utilitarianism, Kantian 
ethics, and principlism—even lead to the strong conclusion that such a prohibition 
is immoral.  
This thesis provides an ethical justification for a regulated organ market. I 




trade is an unregulated commercial transaction, like the illegal trade that often 
catches media attention. By contrast, the organ market proposed and evaluated in 
this thesis is a regulated commercial transaction. For the purposes of the ethical 
evaluation, I refrain from endorsing a specific set of regulations. However, I 
assume a basic requirement in any type of regulated organ market: fully informed, 
rational, and voluntary participants. I discuss further details of the distinction 
between organ trade and organ market in Chapter 2. I argue that many objections 
brought against an organ market rely on the unregulated nature of organ trade and 
hence are not valid when applied to a regulated organ market. In Chapter 2, I also 
describe different types of organ transplantation—such as donation, 
reimbursement, and compensation—which I will generically refer to as 
incentivized and non-incentivized systems. 
In Chapter 3, I commence my exploration of ethical theories, starting with 
utilitarianism. I first evaluate the individual’s act of providing or receiving a 
kidney in terms of its effect on overall utility understood as preference satisfaction 
or as happiness. I argue that in either understanding of the term, the individual 
maximizes utility by engaging in a commercial kidney transaction with informed, 
rational, and voluntary individuals. Since utilitarianism employs the same method 
to judge individual actions as well as systems, I then evaluate the non-
incentivized and incentivized systems in terms of the utility that they generate. 
The utilitarian calculation at this point mostly depends on the empirical data on 
consequences. In view of the existing studies, I claim that an incentivized system, 




relying on comparisons and determining the morally right action as the one that 
maximizes utility, utilitarianism condemns every other option as morally wrong. 
Therefore, according to utilitarianism, not only is a regulated organ market 
morally justified and right, but a prohibition is morally wrong because it reduces 
utility. 
In Chapter 4, I move on to Kantian ethics. I appeal to the formula of 
humanity and to the formula of universal law to evaluate the actions (in this case, 
the maxims) involved in a regulated organ market. I argue that, being based on the 
rational nature, the formula of humanity properly understood only objects to 
certain (mis-)treatment of others’ and one’s own ability to set and pursue ends. It 
follows that, contrary to Kant’s famous claim against selling one’s tooth, donating 
or selling an organ does not necessarily violate one’s humanity. This 
understanding of humanity also provides a basis to analyze Kant’s idea of dignity 
and how it relates to an organ market. I argue that dignity, being ascribed to 
human capacity for rationality, does not object to commercial transaction in 
organs. The formula of universal law leads to the same conclusion through the 
analysis of the plausible maxims that the participants of the organ market would 
hold. I argue that both recipients’ and suppliers’ maxims in an organ market are 
universalizable without contradictions. Hence both recipients’ and suppliers’ 
actions are morally permissible. 
After establishing that Kantian ethics finds an organ market (or more 
precisely, the actions involved in an organ market) morally permissible, I turn to 




organ sales, the formula of humanity actually requires that organ sales be allowed. 
I argue that the prohibition violates the formula of humanity by preventing one 
from following one’s imperfect duty for self-preservation in the only way possible 
for the desperate recipient who does not receive an organ through donation. 
The conclusions of Chapter 4 are particularly noteworthy because Kantian 
notions such as dignity and humanity feature prominently in the objections to 
organ markets, as exemplified by the cited passage from the WHO’s statement. 
This chapter shows not only that these objections misunderstand Kantian ethics, 
but also that Kantian ethics in fact leads to the exact opposite position—namely, 
condemning the prohibition. 
Chapter 5 takes the discussion to a less explored ground and looks at the 
issue of organ market from the perspective of virtue ethics. To evaluate the moral 
status of individual actions in an organ market, I ask if a virtuous agent would 
remain virtuous in a regulated organ market. Comparing a virtuous supplier’s and 
recipient’s attitude towards organ transplantation in a non-incentivized system to 
their attitude in an incentivized system, I argue that a virtuous agent would be 
reflecting as many if not more virtues by participating in a regulated organ 
market. Therefore, I conclude that virtue ethics does not provide grounds for the 
claim that an organ market necessarily entails immoral actions. After refuting the 
claim of immorality of an organ market, I go on to consider the moral grounds for 
a prohibition. This time I pose another question: Would a virtuous agent prefer 
one system to the other? Making a case that a virtuous person would favor a 




argument against a regulated organ market; in fact, it even sustains a case against 
prohibition of an organ market. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I move on to a more contemporary yet very 
influential ethical theory—namely, principlism. In this chapter, I first evaluate the 
recipient’s and the supplier’s positions in incentivized and non-incentivized 
systems of organ transplantation in relation to the four principles. I argue that 
neither of the systems causes necessary violations of the principles of respect for 
autonomy and justice. By contrast, I claim that the principle of nonmaleficence 
and beneficence may pose an objection to any type of organ transplantation. 
However, once the interpretation of these principles is extended to include 
psychological benefits, and hence to justify organ donation, a coherent application 
of principlism, I claim, also justifies a regulated organ market. Thereby, I 
conclude that a regulated organ market does not violate the requirements of 
principlism. On the other hand, I argue that a prohibition of a regulated market in 
fact violates all four principles. Hence, principlism also condemns the prohibition 
of an organ market.  
The last chapter of the thesis serves two purposes: It questions the moral 
basis of the informed consent requirement that I imposed on a regulated organ 
market and provides regulatory arguments drawn from the justifications presented 
throughout Chapters 3 to 6. First, I argue that the basic requirement of informed 
consent is a necessary element for any ethical system of organ transplantation. 
Regardless of the involvement or lack of incentives, a system that does not ensure 




sections of this chapter, I first take a look at some regulations that I favor and 
justify them appealing to some of the ethical theories. Unlike the justification of 
informed consent, these regulations are not univocally justified by all four ethical 
theories. Finally, I turn to two major international guidelines that advocate the 
prohibition of an organ market: the Declaration of Istanbul (2008) and the WHO 
Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation (2010). I 
argue that these guidelines, while making a strong assertion against an organ 
market, fail to provide any justification for their positions. Their claims apply to 
the unregulated organ trade, but are invalid against a regulated organ market.  
This thesis concludes that the current position against a regulated organ 
market not only is unjustified but also rests on wrong assertions. Claiming to 
appeal to ethical justifications, the objections seem to invoke well-established 
theories. However, the truth is that none of the major ethical theories finds a 
regulated organ market immoral, let alone supports a prohibition of it. 
Unfortunately, these oppositions lacking valid justifications continue to give rise 








































A REGULATED ORGAN MARKET 
 
Organ market often invokes images of manipulated and exploited 
individuals, brutal scars and deteriorated health conditions, and trafficked humans 
for the purpose of removing their organs. These images come from the 
unregulated and illegal practice of organ trade. Unfortunately, with the repetition 
of horrific stories in relation to the monetary transaction, any form of 
commercialized organ transplantation raises strong feelings and objections from 
the public. However, a regulated organ market is significantly different from an 
unregulated organ trade. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section provides the 
definitions of the terms that refer to various types of organ transplantation—
namely, donation, reimbursement, compensation, commercialization, organ 
market, and organ trade—which fall under two main categories: incentivized and 
non-incentivized systems. This section clarifies each system as well as the content 
of the categories. It also emphasizes the distinction between organ trade and the 
other systems in terms of the regulatory framework.  
The second section focuses on the characteristics of the existing illegal 
organ trade and compares it to a regulated organ market. Spelling out the crucial 




arguments based on the characteristics of the illegal organ trade become invalid 
when they are employed against an organ market. I consider the problems of 
autonomy and poor health outcomes in the organ trade and argue that these 
problems arise from the unregulated nature of the organ trade as opposed to the 
commercialization of organ transplantation. Additionally, by drawing the relevant 
connections between the system of organ donation and the organ market, I 
propose that both in terms of ensuring autonomy and optimum health outcomes, a 
regulated organ market is likely to mirror the system of donation and not the 




 There are various types of organ transplantation, and the boundaries 
between them often blur, damaging the clarity of arguments. These types of organ 
transplantation can be further categorized as incentivized and non-incentivized 
systems. Before evaluating the arguments on organ market and incentives in 
organ transplantation, it is useful to clarify the terms that are used in order to refer 
to these various types of organ transplantation. 
Donation: the type of organ transplantation where the supplier provides the organ 
without receiving any material benefits in return.13 
Reimbursement: the type of organ transplantation where the supplier’s 
transplantation-related expenses are covered. These expenses must be 
                                                 
13 Throughout this study, I mainly use the term supplier to refer to both donors and sellers within 
different systems of organ transplantation in order to avoid making a distinction between the 




documented and must be strictly necessary for the supplier in order to provide the 
organ for transplantation. They may include transportation, accommodation, and 
necessary medical expenses such as patient evaluation (including hospitalization 
and clinic visits), hospitalization for the living organ transplantation surgical 
procedure, and medical or surgical follow-up clinic visits or hospitalization.14 
Compensation: the type of organ transplantation where the supplier is provided 
with the reimbursement for the transplantation-related costs (such as those listed 
above) and other compensations. Compensation can be divided into two kinds: 
comprehensive reimbursement and incentivized compensation. In addition to the 
reimbursement of the documented costs, comprehensive reimbursement may 
include the loss of income caused by the leave that the supplier had to take from 
work for the pre-transplantation medical procedures and a short- or long-term 
health insurance, which is limited to the medical conditions caused by the 
transplantation. On the other hand, incentivized compensation may include other 
benefits such as tax deduction, college tuition, a long-term comprehensive health 
insurance, and a sum of money for the anxiety and inconvenience caused by the 
transplantation procedure.15 
Commercialization: the type of organ transplantation where the supplier is paid 
for the organ. Commercialization may take the form of just a sum of money given 
to the supplier in return for agreeing to provide her organ for transplantation or it 
                                                 
14 This definition is based on Department of Health and Human Services’ document on 
“Reimbursement of Travel and Subsistence Expenses Program” in the Federal Register, accessed 
April 9, 2012, 
http://www.thefederalregister.com/d.p/2009-03-04-E9-4519. 
15 Arthur J. Matas, “A Gift of Life Deserves Compensation—How to Increase Living Kidney 
Donation with Realistic Incentives,” Policy Analysis 604 (2007): 4; R. S. Gaston et al., “Limiting 
Financial Disincentives in Live Organ Donation: A Rational Solution to the Kidney Shortage,” 




may also include, in addition to the sum of money, reimbursement for necessary 
post-surgery medical care including follow-up care and insurance for 
transplantation related health problems.  
Organ Market: the regulated subtype of commercialized organ transplantation. 
The kinds of organ market can range from a minimally regulated to a heavily 
regulated market with a monopsony distributing the organs according to a 
rationing method such as need or best health outcome. 
Organ Trade: the unregulated (and currently, illegal) subtype of commercialized 
organ transplantation. Typically, organ trade involves use of coercion and 
deception on vulnerable population by the middlemen, inadequate medical care 
for the supplier and recipient, and as a result, poor health outcome for both 
parties. Existing organ trade also includes human trafficking for the purpose of 
removal of organs and transplant tourism where the recipient travels to the 
country where the transaction (usually, illegally) takes place.  
While the distinctions between these types of organ transplantation come 
into play in most guidelines and policies, the discussion of the moral status of an 
organ market is mainly based on the division of incentivized and non-incentivized 
systems. The incentivized systems include the compensated (in the form of 
incentivized compensation) and commercialized organ transplantation, while the 
non-incentivized systems include the organ transplantations through donation, 
reimbursement, and compensation (in the form of comprehensive reimbursement). 
 Even though commercialized organ transplantation, in principle, includes 




definition, in the remainder of this thesis, I distinguish the organ trade from all the 
other types of organ transplantation by categorizing both the incentivized and 
non-incentivized systems as regulated systems. This implies that organ market 
and the commercialized organ transplantation refer to the same regulated 
commercialized system and can be used interchangeably.  
 Until the last part of the thesis that deals with the regulations and their 
ethical justifications, I proceed with the basic requirement for all these regulated 
systems to include only (1) fully informed, (2) rational, and (3) voluntary 
individuals. Any system that fails to ensure this basic requirement falls out of the 
categories of incentivized and non-incentivized systems. Organ trade differs from 
these systems on the basis on this particular requirement by allowing individuals 
to participate in the transaction without being fully informed, rational, and 
voluntary.  
The types of organ transplantation are nested in the sense that the more 
general type includes all the practices of the more narrow type. In ascending order 
of generality, the types are donation, reimbursement, compensation, and 
commercialization. For example, compensated organ transplantation can include 
the practice of reimbursement and donation in addition to the practice of 
compensation, but reimbursed organ transplantation cannot include the practice of 
compensation. This also entails that the incentivized systems can include the 





II. Organ Trade versus Organ Market 
 
According to the WHO, every year, around 5% to 10% of all kidney 
transplants are performed through organ trafficking.16 In Pakistan, two-thirds of 
kidney transplants performed annually involve a foreign transplant patient.17 The 
‘supply’ for this trade comes from many healthy but poor people, mainly living in 
underdeveloped or developing countries. These sellers usually live in such 
extreme poverty that their struggle is as survival oriented as the patients’. In most 
cases, the financial benefits that the sellers are expecting to gain from illegal 
organ trade are their last resort to provide for their families or in some cases to 
afford the medical treatment that a family member needs.18 Hence, both for the 
‘sellers’ and ‘buyers,’ organ trade is a matter of life and death. Unregulated organ 
trade gives rise to many practical problems as well as ethical ones. However, I 
argue that these problems stem from the illegal and unregulated nature of the 
organ trade and not from its commercial nature. Therefore, they are not a 




                                                 
16 Council of Europe, Trafficking in Organs, Tissues and Cells, 58. 
17 International Summit on Transplant Tourism and Organ Trafficking, “The Declaration of 
Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant Tourism,” Clinical Journal of the American Society 
of Nephrology 3, no. 5 (2008): 1227. 
18 Madhav Goyal et al., “Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney in India,” 
Journal of the American Medical Association 288, no. 13 (2002): 1590, doi: 
10.1001/jama.288.13.1589; Stephen Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale: Ethics and Exploitation in the 




A. Problem of Autonomy 
 
Illegal organ trade targets two vulnerable populations: the uneducated 
poor and the hopeless ill. Both groups risk considerable harm to themselves while 
chasing the much-needed benefits. The suppliers are typically misinformed about 
the consequences and the risks that are involved in providing an organ, the 
conditions under which the operation will occur, and the post-surgery treatment 
that they will receive.19 In some cases, the educational background of the 
suppliers even makes them unaware of the fact that selling an organ is illegal, and 
therefore, they are not able to fight for the fulfillment of the agreement if they are 
cheated.20 They are not in the position to rationally weigh the risks against the 
benefits and judge whether the agreement is satisfactory for their purposes. 
Therefore, their compromised position in this transaction is mainly due to the lack 
of conditions that ensure their autonomous—that is, informed, voluntary, and 
rational—decisions. 
A regulated organ market starts with the basic requirement of allowing 
only fully informed, voluntary, and rational individuals to participate in the 
system. A supplier is eligible to make her organ available only if she is competent 
to make a decision, if she has all the relevant information, and if her decision does 
not result from coercion or manipulation. The basic regulatory framework that 
                                                 
19 Brian Resnick, “Living Cadavers: How the Poor Are Tricked Into Selling Their Organs,” The 
Atlantic, March 23, 2012, accessed April 9, 2012,  
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/living-cadavers-how-the-poor-are-tricked-into-
selling-their-organs/254570/. 
20 Larry Rother, “The Organ Trade: A Global Black Market; Tracking the Sale of a Kidney on a 






requires and ensures the autonomy of suppliers is already in place within the 
existing non-incentivized systems of organ transplantation. Since the organ 
market is a regulated system of organ transplantation, in order to follow the same 
eligibility criteria, it can import the same or comparable regulatory means. 
Guaranteeing the autonomy of the supplier is as crucial in a non-
incentivized system as in the incentivized systems. As it can be the case in organ 
market, also in organ donation, the supplier may want to make her organ available 
without completely understanding the consequences and the risks of this act. It 
may also be the case that even though she does not want to donate her organ, she 
is being coerced into doing so. In the system of donation, this can happen within 
the family, where the survival of a family member depends on another family 
member. Especially if the patient is in a more powerful position within the family, 
once a lower-status family member is found to be the match, she has less chance 
to refuse to give her organ. The regulations within the non-incentivized systems 
aim to eliminate such cases and only allow informed, voluntary, and rational 
individuals to donate organs. Similarly, a regulated market has to use a set of 
regulations to eliminate the ineligible suppliers. By doing so, the organ market 
differs from organ trade and excludes the suppliers who are recruited through 







Argument from Vulnerability 
 
The argument from vulnerability objects to the idea that the supplier’s 
autonomy can be ensured in an incentivized system where the supplier is most 
likely to be desperately poor. The argument points out that incentives have the 
power to convince the desperate to act in ways that they would not prefer under 
different circumstances.21 This implies that their economic situation impairs their 
competency for decision making by eliminating their voluntariness. According to 
this understanding of coercion, the desperate economic situation of the suppliers 
puts them in a position where their decisions do not aim to improve their 
conditions; rather, they aim to prevent a worse outcome that they will be facing 
unless they make these decisions.22 This objection, I argue, leads to the 
conclusion that a desperate person is incompetent to make a voluntary decision to 
perform any act—which I will refer as disagreeable act—that makes her worse 
off not in comparison to her actual situation but to the situation of a not desperate 
person. For this conclusion to condemn the sale of kidneys, the term 
‘disagreeable’ must be defined in a particular way which most plausibly refers to 
the harm and risk of the act. However, in that case, many decisions, including job 
choices, of a desperate person become coerced even though actually they make 
her better off. 
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Coercion is typically understood to involve the use of power—usually, in 
the forms of force or threat—to make one take an action that she would not have 
chosen otherwise and to impose “one’s will on the will of other agents.”23 A 
typical case of coercion involves a mugger pointing a gun at the subject and 
giving her two options: handing over her money or being shot. By using the threat 
of violence, the mugger limits the subject’s freedom to her own preferred 
situations and narrows down the subject’s options to two undesirable ones. 
Neither of these options is something that the subject would have chosen 
voluntarily, without the existing threat by the mugger, and both of these options 
are intentionally created by the mugger. Hence, coercion, understood in the form 
of force or threat, overrides one’s voluntariness.  
Applied to the discussion on organ markets, the argument from coercion 
can be formulated in two ways. In the first formulation, the intentional and 
directed nature of force or threat is replaced by restrictive external conditions such 
as severe financial difficulties. Even though economic coercion, as the limiting 
factor of voluntariness for vulnerable groups according to this objection, does not 
work like an intentional agent exercising her will on the subject, it still narrows 
down the available options to undesirable ones. In order to avoid a worse 
outcome, the subject is ‘coerced’ by her financial condition to take an action that 
she would otherwise avoid. Economic desperation acts here as a factor that 
creates a ‘threat’ of worse outcome unless a certain act is taken. This threat, even 
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though it is not intentionally created and inflicted upon the subject, limits the 
subject’s ability to make voluntary choices.  
In the second formulation of the argument, economic agents—such as the 
government or capitalists—are taken as the agents who impose their will on the 
vulnerable groups by intentionally restricting their options to undesirable ones. 
They actively put people into vulnerable positions and then make them offers. In 
this situation, the vulnerable individual is ‘coerced’ to take their offer because it 
makes her better off in relation to her current condition. Yet, if the economic 
agents had not worsened the subject’s pre-offer condition, she would have 
preferred not to take the offer. 
 
Coercion through Economic Conditions 
 
 Formulated in terms of external conditions restricting the choices to 
undesirable and disagreeable ones, the first formulation of the coercion argument 
seems to include many everyday situations. When a student spends all night 
studying, her action is driven by the ‘threat’ of being kicked out of the school. In 
order to avoid this ‘worse’ outcome, her only available choice is to study all night, 
which she would not otherwise choose to do voluntarily. Following the argument 
to the conclusion, the student is not competent to make the voluntary decision to 
study all night since she is deciding under coercion.  
This wide application of the concept of coercion can be restricted by 




“normal or natural or expected course of events” and if the threat or the offer 
worsens the person’s situation in comparison to the baseline, then these threats or 
offers are coercive.24 Nozick allows baseline to be taken as predictive or moral 
and provides two examples to clarify the use of both types. In one of his 
examples, a slave is given the choice between being beaten as usual and 
performing a disagreeable action A. In one sense, the offer is not coercive since it 
allows the slave to avoid an undesirable and expected situation, which is being 
beaten. But on the other hand, the offer acts as a threat by forcing the slave to do 
A with the threat of being beaten otherwise, which is not normal in the moral 
sense, as the argument claims.25 In this example, for the offer to be labeled as 
coercive, the baseline has to be taken not as a predictive one but as a normative 
standard where beating is wrong.26 
In the other example, Nozick shows the use of predictive baseline instead 
of a moral one. In this example, a drug dealer, who regularly gives drugs to an 
addict, tells her that unless she beats up a certain person, the dealer will not sell 
her the drug. Here, the predictive baseline of the addict always receiving drugs 
would determine this as a threat that puts her in a worse off position.27 
 Applying Nozick’s understanding of baseline to the case of an organ 
market where the supplier is a member of a vulnerable group results in the 
following formulation of the argument: Both options that are available to the 
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supplier—that is, not being able to meet her basic needs or selling her kidney—
are making her worse off in comparison to the baseline. Therefore, the argument 
concludes, her decision of selling her kidney is a coerced decision, not a voluntary 
one.  
This argument can be refuted if the baseline is taken as predictive; 
however, this would lead to problems when applied to other types of organ 
transplantation. If the baseline is predictive, then the conclusion does not follow 
given that the supplier’s expected and normal course of events include not being 
able to meet her basic needs. However, a predictive baseline causes problems 
when employed in organ donation. A person who is donating her kidney to a 
relative chooses this option among the two available undesirable and disagreeable 
options, namely, letting a loved one die or giving her kidney. None of these 
options is a part of normal or expected course of events. In this sense, the option 
of giving her kidney makes the donor worse off in comparison to a predictive 
baseline and the argument ends up ruling out the donor’s voluntary and competent 
decision of donating her organ to a dying relative. 
On the other hand, if we take the baseline to be a normative one, then we 
have to assume that not being able to meet one’s basic needs—that is, living in 
extreme poverty—is a morally disagreeable position, just like being beaten in 
Nozick’s slave example. Hence, as all of the slave’s decisions to perform a 
disagreeable act that may allow her avoid being beaten are coerced, all of the 
poor’s decisions to perform a disagreeable act that may allow her to meet her 




comparison to the moral baseline. This leads us to the conclusion that the poor 
person is incompetent to make any voluntary decisions that include performing a 
disagreeable act even if it makes her better off.  
 
Coercion by Economic Agents 
 
 The second formulation of the coercion argument shifts the focus from 
external conditions to an intentional agent acting as the coercer. In this 
formulation, the subject is put into a worse starting point by another agent, who 
later on makes an offer to her. In such a case, the offer is coercive because the 
agent intentionally robs the subject from better options before making her the 
offer. The example given by Zimmerman on this account goes as follows: The 
agent kidnaps the subject and takes her to an island where the available jobs are 
much worse than those in the mainland. The next day, the agent offers the subject 
a job, which provides her an option to avoid starving.28 In this case, the agent’s 
offer is coercive because the subject has a strong preference to another condition 
which is taken off the table by the agent before the offer.  
 Applied to the organ market case, the argument claims that the supplier is 
coerced into selling her kidney by the economic agents who actively push her into 
poverty. Therefore, the offer of selling her kidney in return of money is a coercive 
offer.29 However, this argument is not strong.  
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 As argued by the critiques, Zimmerman’s account requires a further 
method to determine which initial comparison can be taken as relevant.30  Since, 
unlike in Zimmerman’s island case, there is no initial act done by the economic 
agents to change the supplier’s position, it is unclear what should be taken as the 
relevant comparison for the supplier’s position before interference of the 
economic agents. In the case of the organ market, the relevant economic agent 
who both puts the seller into an economically disadvantaged position and who 
makes the offer of buying her organ would be the government or the capitalists. 
However, it cannot be argued that whenever the government can provide a better 
situation for the seller, all the other offers are coercive. If that were the case, 
unless the government gives all the wealth to the supplier, the supplier always 
remains in the coerced position.31 Therefore, the claim for a coercive offer has to 
refer to a method of determining what the relevant comparisons or baselines for 
the supplier’s preferred situations could be. Moreover, such a method also needs 
to take into account the other subjects within the system. Given this understanding 
of coercion, any redistributive system that would put the supplier in a better 
position would run into the coercion problem in relation to those whose wealth or 
resources will be actively restricted for the sake of supplier. 
 For the sake of the argument, let us assume that some relevant comparison 
is formulated and the people who are economically disadvantaged in the existing 
system are in fact subjected to coercive offers whenever the capitalist system or 
government provides an option that is less desirable than the alternative pre-offer 
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initial state. This leads us to the same conclusion as the first formulation of the 
coercion argument in the previous subsection. According to this argument, every 
offer involving an unpleasant or disagreeable act for the poor person in the 
existing system is coercive. This either cuts across the board for most jobs and 
most living conditions of disadvantaged people or has to rely on an argument why 
kidney sale is ‘disagreeable’ whereas a risky or unpleasant job is not. 
 
What is a ‘Disagreeable’ Act? 
 
 For the conclusion of either formulations of the coercion argument to hold 
in cases of kidney sale, there must be a relevant aspect of kidney transplantation 
that distinguishes it from other practices that the individual voluntarily engages in, 
which are found agreeable in comparison to a moral baseline. Organ 
transplantation is an irreversible process that involves certain risks to the supplier. 
If these risks are extreme, then the argument can point out that no one, who is not 
desperate, would voluntarily take such risks, which is a reason to doubt the 
voluntariness of the individuals in vulnerable group. However, this claim proves 
either to be weak or to render many other practices also ‘extremely risky’ once the 
relevant data on risk comparison is considered. The study that investigates the 
short- and long-term health risks of over 80,000 living kidney donors in the 
United States reveals that the mortality rate is 0.031% within ninety days after the 




differ from the mortality rate of the control group.32 In a legal system of 
commercial organ transplantation, we can assume that the mortality rate will not 
differ from the organ donors, given that they will be subjected to the same 
standard of care. In comparison, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
in 2010, the annual fatal work injury rate for fishers was 0.116%, for logging 
workers 0.092%, and for aircraft pilots and flight engineers 0.071%.33  
To be sure, the foregoing is not a perfect comparison, given that the 
kidney transplantation is a one-time act as opposed to an occupation. In order to 
provide a common denominator for comparison, we can focus on the risk and 
earning comparisons for a given period of time. For ninety days after the surgery, 
the supplier has a 0.031% mortality risk, which is almost equal to the fisher’s 
mortality risk for the same period (0.029%). According to the best available 
estimate, supply and demand in a market for kidneys in the United States would 
reach a balance at a price of $15,200 (in 2005).34 The annual median income for 
fishers is $27,000.35 Thus, in three months, the fisher would earn $6,750—less 
than half of what the kidney supplier makes—by taking approximately the same 
risk. Moreover, returning to work after a kidney donation takes only two to six 
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weeks depending on the supplier’s type of work.36 This means that the kidney 
supplier has extra six weeks to work and earn more money in addition to the 
$15,200 she receives for the kidney. 
These comparisons always remain inexact, given the several distinctions 
between a risky occupation and a risky act. However, if the objection is based on 
the idea that organ transplantation is so ‘extremely risky’ that one would never do 
it voluntarily, then we should also question the voluntariness of the decision of 
those individuals from vulnerable groups who would like to work as fishers or 
logging workers. Given this comparison, it can be reasonably argued that acting 
as a fisher for three months is much less beneficial but equally risky as selling 
one’s kidney; and hence more disagreeable for a non-desperate person. Asserting 
that they lack any decision-making capacity for things that are found ‘extremely 
risky’ according to an undetermined criteria of ‘extreme risk’ is a very strong and 
problematic claim that seems to lead to a conclusion that such risky occupations 
should only be available to the better-off members of the society, leaving the poor 
with even less options for making a living. 
The upshot of this analysis of the argument from vulnerability is this: 
Regardless of the interpretation of the concept of coercion, the coercion argument 
leads to a claim of incompetency of vulnerable populations in many aspects of 
their lives. If the individuals’ coerced actions should be prevented, then much 
decision-making capacity needs to be taken away from vulnerable populations, 
which certainly contributes to their vulnerability even further. On the other hand, 
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if we assume that the economic difficulties are factors that restrict the individuals’ 
scope of actions but not their ability to act voluntarily, then by providing the 
necessary regulations that ensure autonomous decision making, a regulated 
market is competent to mostly eliminate the non-autonomous participation in the 
system. Any system, whether the system for selling or donating organs or taking a 
risky job, should be regulated such that the individuals participate in them 
voluntarily—i.e. without being physically forced, manipulated, threatened, etc. 
The problem of coercion is not specific to the incentivized systems of organ 
transplantation. For it to be specific, the act of selling a kidney in a regulated 
market would have to differ in a relevant sense from other risky or unpleasant acts 
that individuals do. In the coercion argument, relevant differences pertain to the 
baseline condition or individuals’ ability to understand the implications of their 
choice. No such differences would seem to exist. In conclusion, one cannot talk 
about how to eliminate coercion in incentivized systems as if it were a special 
case. If it exists, the problem of coercion is the same in other transactions like 
donation or work contracts. If we think the regulations of those other transactions 
are appropriate, we can extend them to the organ market; if not, we would need to 
reform them for all of these transactions. 
 
B. Problem of Poor Health Outcome 
 
Kidney donation surgery involves risks that are present in any major 




reaction to anesthesia, and death.37 In organ trade, suppliers typically undergo this 
surgery without adequate pre-operation care to determine their eligibility, under 
inadequate operation conditions, with insufficient medical resources, and with 
incompetent medical staff. These low standards of medical care cause the 
procedure to result in many complications and to become severely harmful and 
even fatal for the supplier. In 58% to 86% of the illegal living kidney 
transplantation cases, the perceived health status of the supplier results in 
deterioration.38 On the other hand, under a well-regulated system where the 
suppliers are carefully selected, the medical staff and facilities are adequate, and 
pre- and post-surgery care is provided, these risks are considered to be 
“negligible,” says the WHO.39 
In the system of donation, the suppliers’ quality of life is not negatively 
affected by giving an organ; moreover, in a study conducted in Germany, 98.5% 
of the suppliers reported that they did not regret their decisions.40 Since the 
relevant distinction between the health results of organ trade and organ donation 
stems from the difference in their regulations, a regulated system of organ market 
is expected to give the same health results as the system of organ donation. 
Considering that the suppliers in the organ market will be provided with the same 
standard of care as in the system of donation, the risks that they take will also be 
‘negligible.’ By adopting the same eligibility criteria as the existing system of 
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organ donation to screen out physically or psychologically weak suppliers, the 
organ market would ensure not to cause more harm than the donation system.41 
This claim can be challenged by skepticism. While the standard of care 
seems to be the principal factor for health-outcomes, one may argue that other 
factors such as the suppliers’ socio-economic conditions have unforeseeable 
effects on the result, and that these other factors are likely to be systematically 
different in an organ market as compared to the existing system of organ 
donation. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive empirical data available about 
the health status of the organ suppliers in a regulated organ market since a legal 
incentivized system of organ transplantation only exists in Iran.42 The Iranian 
system is proven to be very efficient in providing organs; it eliminated the waiting 
list for kidneys in only eleven years.43  Yet, it also raised concerns about the well-
being of the suppliers. A study conducted in 2000 on 300 suppliers found that 
85% of the suppliers regretted their decisions and 76% would not recommend 
others to provide their organs.44 The study also reports many facts about the 
actual operation of the system indicating that the regulatory framework was 
compromised.45 However, more recent evidence does not agree with these 
findings. In a study conducted in 2005 and 2006 on 478 suppliers, 91% were 
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satisfied with their experience and 53% recommended the procedure to others.46 
While the data is restricted and a single country’s experience cannot be taken as 
representative of the health outcomes of the regulated market in general, the 
Iranian experience does not suggest a strong reason to doubt the assumption that 
the health outcomes are mostly determined by the regulatory structure and the 
standard of care. Therefore, as long as the same standard of care is applied to the 
organ market as in the system of donation, the health outcomes are expected to be 
very similar to the system of donation and significantly different from the illegal 
organ trade. 
Unlike the typical supplier in organ trade, the recipient has a better 
understanding of the conditions of the trade. Even though the recipients are also 
likely to be manipulated and cheated by false securities and promises, their 
socioeconomic conditions and existing communication with health care providers 
usually grant them access to more information than is available to the suppliers. 
Yet, it can be argued that the desperation of their conditions, their physical and 
mental sufferings, and the immediate danger of death by organ failure hinder their 
judgment and cause them to take higher risks with high costs. The illegal 
characteristic of organ trade causes various risks to the recipient that could have 
been otherwise eliminated by a control mechanism. In organ trade, the best match 
for the recipient, the hygiene of the organ against donor-transmitted infections, 
the competency of the medical staff, and the adequacy of the medical center are 
not guaranteed. According to a study that compares the health results of recipients 
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who received organs through transplant tourism, that is, by travelling to another 
country for organ transplantation from a local donor, and the recipients in UCLA, 
27% of tourists had to be hospitalized for transplantation-related infections as 
opposed to the 9% among the UCLA patients. One-year graft survival was 89% in 
tourists while it was 98% in typical patients, and acute rejection in one year was 
30% in tourists whereas the same condition only occurred in 12% of typical 
patients.47  
Organ trade with or without the involvement of transplant tourism presents 
risks to the recipient that are avoidable in a regulated system. These risks do not 
result from commercializing organs as opposed to relying on altruistic motives. 
Instead, these risks are closely tied to the unregulated nature of the organ trade. 
Hence, in a regulated organ market, the health results for the recipients should 
demonstrate the characteristics of the health results within the system of donation, 
considering that both systems will follow the same standard of health care. Unlike 
organ trade, an organ market is likely to eliminate poor health outcomes that are 
due to the inadequacy of the procedure and deliver similar results as the system of 
donation. 
 
Argument from Motivation 
 
It is argued that a system of commercialization necessarily results in worse 
health outcomes for both the supplier and the recipient because of the limitations 
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of pre-donation medical screening and the reliance of the information provided by 
the supplier. The argument is that while the supplier in the organ market is likely 
to hide information that may make her ineligible to provide an organ, the supplier 
in organ donation is open for disclosure since she has an interest in her well-being 
as well as that of the recipient.48 This objection has its roots in Richard Titmuss’s 
well-known book, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. 
Published in 1970, the book advocates altruism as the preferable motive for blood 
donation as opposed to financial incentives, referring to the resulting low quality 
of blood that is sold by the desperate and also unhealthy individuals. 
There are two problems with this argument: (1) It proposes a false 
dichotomy by comparing a ‘seller’ who does not care about the well-being of 
herself or of the recipient and a ‘donor’ who cares, and (2) it neglects the medical 
developments in the area of testing for diseases. In the existing system of 
donation, around 78.9% of all transplantations are done from deceased donors.49 
While the living directed donors—that is, donors who give their organ to a 
specific recipient who is usually a family member or a friend—may be typically 
more inclined for disclosure, this disclosure can certainly not be attained from the 
deceased donors. For deceased donors, the doctors have to rely on the medical 
tests that are done in a limited time frame and the medical history that is either 
unattainable or a mourning family member can provide. When it comes to the 
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altruistic living donors, the studies suggest that their motives do not necessarily 
entail complete honesty.50 
On the other hand, most of the existing information about the behavior of 
organ sellers comes from the illegal practice of organ trade where the suppliers 
are not well-informed about what the risks are both for themselves and for the 
recipients. These sellers are not representative of the suppliers in a regulated 
organ market. A big jump is needed in order to conclude that the aversion to 
disclosure under the circumstances of misinformation and manipulation in organ 
trade entails that the same behavior is to be expected from the well-informed 
suppliers in a trustworthy and functioning system. Moreover, while there are 
studies showing that illegal organ trade results in worse health outcomes for the 
recipients, several other studies, as well as the two largest studies done in the last 
fifteen years, documented that graft and patient survival do not differ significantly 
between recipients of donated kidneys and recipients who traveled for commercial 
organ transaction.51 
Medical technology has improved tremendously in the last fifty years. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, it was not as easy and quick to test blood for 
transmitted diseases as now. In the 1980s, AIDS cases and the difficulties of 
detecting the disease provided a reason to suspect that paying for blood donations 
would yield “bad blood,” causing more blood transfusion-related HIV 
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infections.52 Since then, however, medical technology has improved greatly, and 
laboratory testing is now available for many infectious diseases. Using the nuclear 
acidic testing, HIV infections can be detected with a seven-day window between 
the occurrence of infection and the detection of the virus.53 Under proper 
regulations, the supplier goes through a medical check-up for eligibility before 
being accepted as an organ provider, which guards the recipient from 
transplantation-related diseases. Moreover, a regulated organ market enables 
suppliers to be fully informed about the risks that they are also putting themselves 
into by not disclosing information. 
The link between altruistic motivation and health outcomes is unclear. 
Titmuss’s study takes into consideration a medical technology that is significantly 
less developed than the current one. Moreover, it has also been suggested that his 
argument is based on a methodologically flawed model, causing his conclusion of 
blood donors’ altruistic motivation to be unsupported.54  An organ market shares 
a similar regulatory framework with the system of donation, securing optimum 
health results for the suppliers and the recipients. Most poor health outcomes can 
be prevented by proper pre-donation screening and compliance to adequate 
standard of care, which are absent in organ trade. 
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Organ suppliers’ unawareness of the risks, terms of agreement, and the 
standard of care make them vulnerable to be taken advantage of in a system of 
organ trade. Since by selling their organs, they participate in an illegal activity, 
they also cannot fight for their rights if they are deceived, taken advantage of, or 
physically harmed beyond what they have agreed on. They are typically promised 
a simple surgery and adequate post-surgery care, which they usually end up not 
receiving, and this causes their overall health to deteriorate. In the end, many 
suppliers spend the money that they have received for the organ to receive 
treatment for their own transplantation-related health problems.55  
These problems of autonomy and poor health outcome in organ trade 
cause a negative reaction against the overall idea of commercialization of organ 
transplantation. Because the only characteristic that an organ market shares with 
organ trade is the commercial transaction of organs, many objections that the 
organ market is faced with refer to the problems that are due to the unregulated 
nature of organ trade. The causes of these problems do not lie in the commercial 
transaction, and hence, objections referring to these problems are irrelevant for 
the evaluation of an organ market.  
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As established in the previous chapter, many claims of immorality against 
an organ market are based on observations from and about the organ trade and fail 
to acknowledge the relevant distinction between the two. Since these objections 
are misdirected, they do not need to be further analyzed. Other objections appeal 
to ethical theories in order to make a case against an organ market. These 
objections typically point to an aspect of the organ market and claim that this 
aspect entails acts that are immoral within a given ethical framework. In order to 
examine this claim extensively, in this part, I evaluate the organ market in relation 
to four ethical theories, namely, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and 
principlism. I argue that while some of these objections are invalid because they 
misinterpret either the characteristics of a regulated organ market or the demands 
of the ethical framework, others may successfully argue against an organ market 
while also condemning many other practices including organ donation. 
In Part I, I have presented the definitions of various types of organ 
transplantation and categorized them under the systems of incentivized and non-
incentivized organ transplantation. In Part II, I present the four ethical theories 
and evaluate these two types of systems in relation to these theories. By doing so, 
I not only analyze the arguments against an organ market but also consider how 
these arguments relate to non-incentivized systems. I conclude that none of these 
ethical theories has a strong objection against an organ market. On the contrary, I 
claim that these theories affirmatively favor an organ market. That is, I argue not 




perspective of all four of these ethical theories, but that these theories also provide 






























Many arguments on the moral status of organ transplantation systems 
focus on the consequences of these systems. In particular, supporters of the organ 
market often employ some type of utilitarian framework, where the moral status 
of the system depends on its maximization of utility, claiming that the organ 
market is the most likely system to bring out the highest utility.56 By contrast, 
opponents of the organ market, to the extent that they consider consequences, 
typically weigh them in accordance to other values such as equality and solidarity, 
instead of utility.57 In this chapter, I provide a utilitarian justification for the organ 
market and evaluate the relevant objections within the boundaries of this 
framework, showing that they fail to make a strong case. 
Utilitarianism has different versions, none of which is free from 
controversies. Classic utilitarianism, as a hedonistic act-consequentialism, judges 
an act to be morally right if and only if its consequences bring out the maximum 
good or minimum bad, where ‘good’ refers to happiness or pleasure and ‘bad’ 
refers to suffering or pain. While capturing the basic value judgment in the 
utilitarian framework, this formulation runs into several problems such as how to 
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57 Debra Satz, Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 189–205; S. M. Rothman and D. J. Rothman, “The Hidden Cost of Organ Sale,” American 




count or predict happiness and how to differentiate between various types of 
pleasure.58 Preference utilitarianism avoids some of these problems by replacing 
happiness and pleasure with preference satisfaction. Claiming that an action is 
morally right if and only if it satisfies the maximum number of preferences of the 
maximum number of people, this version of utilitarianism avoids the problems of 
predicting happiness and relies only on the actual, stated preferences of people.59 
In this formulation, the satisfaction of whatever a competent individual states to 
be her preference or desire is the ‘good.’60  
Although there is no unanimously favored version of utilitarianism, 
classical and preference utilitarianism are the leading versions that are widely 
                                                 
58 In many cases, application of the principle of maximizing happiness requires a choice between 
the immediate happiness and the overall happiness. In addition to this, there can be a mismatch 
between what will make one and others happy and what one thinks that will make one and others 
happy. Hence, one may misjudge which activity will create most pleasure both for oneself and for 
others while doing the utilitarian calculation with the aim of producing the most happiness for 
most number of people. For further discussion on main issues in consequentialism, see Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified 
September 27, 2011,  
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/consequentialism/. 
59 Preference utilitarianism may not differ from classical utilitarianism if it is assumed that 
satisfaction of desires and preferences increases happiness and pleasure or if the assumption is that 
one always prefers happiness and pleasure. In that case, it can be argued that any discrepancy 
between the calculation results of the classical and preference utilitarianism is caused by 
misjudgment or misinformation of the individual. Yet, the distinguishing factor between the 
classical and preference utilitarianism is the claim that one does not necessarily value overall 
happiness and may prefer to sacrifice happiness for things that she values more. An artist may 
think that unhappiness feeds her art and decide to sacrifice her happiness for her desire and 
preference to excel in her art. See, Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 13–14. 
While trying to eliminate the difficulties in predicting happiness, preference utilitarianism 
remains subject to similar problems encountered in classical utilitarianism, particularly the issues 
about conflicting present and retrospective preferences and weighing competing preferences. 
These problems show themselves in cases such as those involving one’s preference to smoke. One 
may have a very strong immediate preference for smoking, yet the same person may 
retrospectively state that her preference is never to have smoked, given her current smoking 
related illnesses. Similarly, it is not clear how the preference utilitarianism works when one’s 
desires for ends and means do not match such as the desire to be slim and the desire to eat high-
calorie food. For further discussion of utilitarianism, see R. M. Hare, “A Utilitarian Approach,” in 
A Companion to Bioethics, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1998). 




applied. Instead of taking a side on the debate of versions of utilitarianism, I use 
both classical and preference utilitarianism to evaluate the moral status actions in 
incentivized and non-incentivized systems of organ transplantation. To keep the 
two approaches more distinct from each other, while applying classical 
utilitarianism, I focus on the overall long-term happiness of individuals, whereas 
in applying preference utilitarianism, I keep the focus on the present rational, 
informed, and voluntary preferences of agents. 
Unlike other ethical theories that I focus on in the following chapters, 
utilitarianism judges any system and policy by using the same method as it does 
for the individual action.61  Therefore, a utilitarian evaluation of the systems of 
organ transplantation can be given independently from the evaluation of an 
individual’s decision. Yet, since the main question that I examine while 
evaluating the moral status of these systems is based on the statement that an 
organ market necessarily entails immoral acts, in the first section of this chapter, I 
evaluate the individual’s actions within a utilitarian framework. This evaluation 
                                                 
61 In this analysis, I do not explicitly appeal to rule utilitarianism, but the results would be the 
same. The main distinction between rule and act utilitarianism can be formulated in terms of the 
decision procedure. According to rule utilitarianism, “agents should decide what to do by applying 
rules whose acceptance will produce the best consequences” (see, Brad Hooker, “Rule 
Consequentialism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last modified January 9, 2008, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/ consequentialism-rule/). The result of this 
procedure diverges from the result of the act utilitarian decision procedure when the overall 
acceptance of a rule changes the utility effect. For example, the acceptance of the rule “keep your 
promises” allows trust relations to be formed in the society, which would not be possible if 
keeping a promise is dependent on the case-based expected utility at the moment when the 
promise is to be kept or broken. Assuming that the existence of trust relations in society increases 
overall utility, the results of the act and rule utilitarian analyses diverge in this case. However, 
there is no straightforward argument why such a divergence would be found in the case of 
evaluating the organ market, i.e., why a society-wide (ex ante) calculation for all possible 
donations should differ from individual (ex post) calculations. To be sure, arguments from 
crowding-out and social preferences could create such a divergence, but I discuss and refute them 





argues that in a regulated organ market, the individual’s behavior does not 
necessarily entail immoral acts; on the contrary, in many individual cases, selling 
a kidney would be the morally right choice for the individual. 
Utilitarianism relies on a comparison of consequences in order to 
determine the morally right act or the morally right system by the utility that it 
generates, and unless two actions or two systems result in equal happiness or 
preference satisfaction, only one of these actions or systems is morally right and 
permissible. Being based on consequences, in the utilitarian evaluation, the moral 
judgment on an act or a system essentially depends on the empirical evaluation 
once the ‘good’ is defined. Which act generates the maximum good? 
Retrospectively, it may be easier to answer this question by looking at the 
consequences of the act.62 However, in the decision-making process, this question 
becomes even more complicated by taking the hypothetical form, what would be 
the act that will generate the maximum good? Here, further complications arise 
from the uncertainty of predictions. Given these, the moral evaluation of organ 
transplantation systems largely depends on the comparison of best available 
predictions of the consequences that each system would generate.  
Within the limitation of the uncertainty of these predictions, in the second 
section, I evaluate the prohibition of an organ market, comparing the incentivized 
systems and non-incentivized systems of organ transplantation to find out which 
system is most likely to maximize utility. The comparison reveals that the 
incentivized system, and especially a regulated organ market, is most likely to 
                                                 
62 Of course, questions like which consequences to take into account or how to measure the utility 




bring out the maximum overall long-term happiness and the maximum immediate 
preference satisfaction. This conclusion, which also entails that prohibition of the 
organ market is morally wrong, is challenged by the opponents of an organ 
market and at the end of this chapter, I turn to two of the most commonly raised 
objections against this evaluation—namely, the argument from crowding-out and 
the argument from social preferences. 
 
I. Evaluation of Individual’s Action 
 
Utilitarianism demands that for an individual’s act to be morally right, it 
must maximize the utility for the maximum number of people. This requires the 
individual to foresee her action’s consequences as well as the scope of their 
effects. Admittedly, this is a high demand, and in many cases, the individual is not 
likely to have a full grasp of the consequences of her action and to be able to 
make accurate predictions. Yet, within these limitations, an individual can still 
evaluate her options with the aim of maximizing overall happiness and preference 
satisfaction and determine her actions accordingly. From an individual’s 
perspective, the utilitarian calculation typically claims that providing and 
accepting a kidney is the morally right act, even though the morally right type of 






A. Kidney Transplant without Material Benefits 
 
A kidney transplant saves the life of the recipient with a very high survival 
rate, and it involves relatively low risks and a short recovery period for the 
supplier. In the kidney transplants done in the United States from a living donor, 
in 2008, the survival rate was 98.7%.63 The transplant not only drastically 
increases the recipient’s life expectancy, but it also enables her to lead a higher 
quality of life by freeing the patient from long-term and painful treatments such as 
dialysis.  
On the other hand, in kidney donation, the supplier experiences some post-
surgery pain but returns to her normal life in few weeks.64 Typically, the supplier 
does not suffer from long-term pain or discomfort related to the surgery,65 and as 
a systemic review on more than 5,000 kidney donors shows, the majority of 
suppliers do not experience any psychological or social problems related to 
donation.66 In a smaller study with 161 kidney suppliers, 96.1% was willing to 
donate again and 90.1% recommended donation. Moreover, the quality of life of 
the suppliers did not differ from the healthy standards.67 Two studies done in 
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65 Ibid. 
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Scandinavia show that in the long run, the longevity of patients who have one of 
their kidneys removed is not lower than in the overall population.68 
Given this information, it can be argued that the recipient’s acceptance and 
the supplier’s offer of a kidney maximize overall utility. From the preference 
satisfaction perspective, it is clear that the recipient prefers to be alive and the 
supplier prefers to save the recipient’s life. Looking at the overall happiness, 
through kidney transplantation, the recipient avoids a great amount of pain and 
anxiety caused by long-term medical treatment such as dialysis, low quality of 
life, and fear of death. By increasing her quality of life and avoiding death, the 
recipient is expected to have more pleasure.  
Similarly, by providing an organ, the supplier satisfies her desire to make 
her organ available. Even though the supplier suffers through the pain and anxiety 
of the surgery, her overall happiness is either increased by performing an act that 
she desires to do or decreased relatively minimally for only a short term. To 
summarize, it can be argued that even if the supplier experiences some pain and 
discomfort, the recipient’s increased utility outweighs the supplier’s relatively 
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B. Kidney Transplant with Material Benefits 
 
If kidney transplantation maximizes the overall utility, then from an 
individual’s perspective, in most circumstances, one should provide one’s kidney 
for transplantation. However, this does not entail that one should give a kidney 
without receiving any material benefits in return. Whether or not one should 
receive material benefits in return for providing one’s kidney is again a question 
of maximizing utility and is completely case dependent. From a classical 
utilitarian perspective, if the supplier knows that the happiness that the material 
benefits will bring her outweighs the negative effects on the recipient for paying 
these benefits, then the morally right act for the supplier is to provide her kidney 
in return for benefits. For example, if the supplier is extremely poor, which is the 
common assumption of opponents of the organ market for the typical supplier, 
then the morally right act for her is to sell her organ instead of giving it away, as 
long as the recipient is not financially even worse off. On the other hand, if the 
supplier will not derive any significant utility from the material benefits, while 
paying will cause great difficulties and suffering for the recipient, then the 
supplier should simply give her organ without receiving any benefits. From the 
preference utilitarian perspective, the supplier should seek the type of transaction 
that will satisfy both her and the recipient’s desires.  
The same analysis holds for the recipient’s action. The recipient should 
also judge the utility effect of a possible material transaction and decide whether 




preference satisfaction, just like the supplier, the recipient should also search for 
the transaction that will be satisfactory both for her and for the supplier.  
Utilitarian evaluation of the systems of organ transplantation also includes 
the effects on third parties. Typically, while the recipient’s family and friends 
have a strong preference for the recipient to live, the supplier’s family and friends 
may prefer that she save someone’s life or may prefer that she avoid such risks. 
Similarly, while the family and friends of the recipient will avoid great pain and 
experience happiness when the recipient survives, the family and friends of the 
supplier may experience some anxiety about her well-being or pleasure because 
of their approval of this act. In the end, typically, it is clear that providing an 
organ will affect more people positively and intensely and less people negatively 
and temporarily. 
Utilitarian analysis shows that in general, the morally right act for an 
individual is to participate in organ transplantation; however, the morally right 
form of this transaction—namely, whether or not it should involve benefits—is 
almost completely case dependent. This conclusion supports an organ market 
since the incentivized systems do not exclude the non-incentivized organ 
transplantation, whereas the system of donation only prohibits an organ market. 
Hence, in an organ market, the individual has more options that can serve to 






II. Evaluation of the Systems of Organ Transplantation 
 
A.     Non-Incentivized Systems 
 
The non-incentivized systems of organ transplantation include donation, 
reimbursement, and comprehensive reimbursement. The non-incentivized systems 
aim to enable the suppliers to participate in organ transplantation by removing 
disincentives without providing incentives to make an organ available. By 
removing as many obstacles as possible, these systems aim to increase the number 
of suppliers while keeping the motivation and the nature of the act of giving an 
organ unchanged.  
As argued in the previous section, kidney transplantation increases the 
overall utility by saving the lives of recipients and causing only short-term and 
relatively minimal pain and discomfort for the suppliers while satisfying both 
parties’ preferences. The effect of kidney transplantation on the family and friends 
of the participating parties also generates greater happiness and preference 
satisfaction overall. Hence, all foreseeable things considered, the non-incentivized 
systems of organ transplantation lead to better consequences in terms of happiness 
and preference satisfaction than the absence of organ transplantation, and 
therefore they are the morally preferred choice among the two options. 
By removing the disincentives such as the costs of pre-donation tests and 
screenings or of the post-surgery health issues related to the donation using 




part in the system without being restricted by the financial costs of the procedure. 
This enables the suppliers who desire to give their organs to have the chance to 
satisfy this preference. Also, by making it possible for more suppliers to be able to 
save recipients’ lives, the systems that remove more disincentives can bring about 
a higher amount of overall happiness and preference satisfaction.  
 
B.     Incentivized Systems 
 
Unlike the non-incentivized systems, the incentivized systems of organ 
transplantation aim to increase the number of available organs by adding new 
motivations to participate in the system. Systems of compensation and 
commercialization use incentives in forms of money, health insurance, or tax 
reductions to make more individuals interested in being suppliers. By providing 
such benefits, the incentivized systems also work as a way of acquiring these 
benefits for those who need them and cannot afford them otherwise. Such a 
situation would give the individual a reason to consider providing her organ as a 
means of acquiring those ends even if she was not contemplating participating in 
organ transplantation before.  
The assumption is that since the incentivized systems do not prohibit 
giving an organ without accepting the incentives (i.e., donating an organ or just 
accepting reimbursement in return), suppliers who are motivated by incentives 
add to the pool of already interested suppliers and result in an increased number 




saved in such a system in comparison to the non-incentivized systems. Once the 
pool of available organs becomes large enough, there are additional benefits to 
just having more patients receive organs. A bigger pool of organs allows better 
matches to be found for the patients, and through good matches, the graft and 
patient survival rates increase while the rates of repeated transplantations 
decrease.69 This way, not only do more patients receive organs, but they are also 
less likely to return to the waiting list. Also, by shortening and even eliminating 
the period that the patient spends on dialysis, the incentivized systems aim to 
increase the patient’s quality of life and the graft survival after the kidney 
transplantation, given that the waiting time on dialysis has a significantly 
detrimental effect on the outcome of the transplantation.70 
From the perspective of preference utilitarianism, the increased number of 
suppliers and recipients in the incentivized systems results in greater preference 
satisfaction. In addition to the satisfaction of the recipients whose lives are saved, 
of their families and friends who do not lose their loved ones, and of the suppliers 
who prefer to save lives without desiring the incentives, those suppliers who 
prefer benefits like medical insurance, tax reduction, or a sum of money have 
their preferences satisfied. Applying the classical utilitarian evaluation, recipients 
are avoiding great pain and deriving great happiness over time, especially with the 
bigger pool of available organs. On the other hand, suppliers also avoid the pain 
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resulting from lacking those benefits that they need, and derive happiness by 
using these benefits and/or by saving someone’s life. In conclusion, it can be 
claimed that the incentivized systems provide the maximum preference 
satisfaction and happiness in comparison to the non-incentivized ones.  
The organ market is the most effective system of providing incentives 
since it provides a sum of money that the suppliers are free to use for any 
purposes that they prefer. It does not rely on a package of benefits to attract 
suppliers; instead, it provides the most straightforward type of incentive. This 
does not mean that it necessarily excludes any ‘free services’ for the supplier. 
Depending on how it is regulated, organ markets can take different forms, varying 
from a sum of money given to the supplier to free pre- and post-surgery care and 
health insurance for transplant-related problems in addition to the sum of money. 
Given its effective incentives, an organ market is most likely to provide the 
highest number of suppliers attracting not only those in need of specific benefit 
packages but also anyone who is interested in providing an organ in return for a 
sum of money. 
 In the incentivized systems, a bigger number of recipients’ most important 
preferences of staying alive and having a higher quality of life are satisfied. It can 
be argued that in the incentivized systems, recipients will have to pay for the 
organ or have the adequate insurance that will cover the costs of buying an organ, 
and they may prefer not paying for the organs and hence to be in a system of 
donation. However, the system of donation cannot supply enough organs to meet 




is likely to minimize or completely overcome the gap between the supply and 
demand with lower rates of repeated transplantations given better matches. Hence, 
the recipients cannot reasonably prefer the system of donation without preferring 
to drastically decrease their chances for survival. Also, since the incentivized 
systems do not prohibit donations, the option of getting an organ for free remains. 
When it comes to the suppliers, they only participate in this transaction if they 
find it satisfactory. Hence, from the preference utilitarian perspective, allowing 
organ market satisfies the supplier’s preferences as well as the recipient’s.  
As before, the hedonistic account is in agreement with preference 
utilitarianism in the evaluation of an organ market. While the recipient increases 
her overall long-term happiness, the supplier is also likely to increase her 
happiness by agreeing to accept short-term pain and discomfort in return for 
money that the supplier is free to use for her education, for eliminating her debts, 
for medical services of her loved ones, for personal health care, for insurance, for 
starting a business, or for charity if she does not need the money for herself. The 
supplier can reasonably judge all of these benefits to override the short-term pain 
and discomfort related to the transplantation, especially if she also derives 
happiness from saving another person’s life. 
 Utilitarianism, taken in the form of preference satisfaction or 
maximization of happiness, leads to the conclusion that the incentivized systems, 
and specifically the organ market, is the morally right choice given that it 
generates the highest utility among the options. Of course, this is not an absolute 




consequences or circumstantial factors may prove that organ market does not 
produce maximum happiness or preference satisfaction. If, for example, in a given 
country, the survival rate of organ transplantation is extremely low for both the 
recipient and the supplier, it may turn out that allowing more people to take this 
risk actually reduces the overall utility and preference satisfaction. For this 
example to work, the risk rate must either be misjudged by the experts or by the 
suppliers. In such a case, the misjudgment of risk and the inaccuracy of 
predictions would lead to a result where more people participate in organ 
transplantation, which results in worse consequences than having less people 
participate. However, given the existing information and the foreseeable 
consequences, a prohibition against an organ market from a utilitarian perspective 
is unfounded since the organ market is most likely to maximize overall utility and 
hence is the morally right system for organ transplantation. 
 
III. Objections to an Organ Market 
 
There are many objections to the conclusion that the regulated organ 
market for kidneys is the morally right choice and therefore should not be 
prohibited. I next consider two main objections that point out factors that may 
arise from endorsing an organ market: the crowding-out effect and the social 
preferences. Both of these objections challenge the idea that an organ market is 
likely to increase utility. The argument from crowding-out claims that the number 




incentivized system. And the argument from social preferences argues that the 
negative utility arising from public dissatisfaction of endorsing certain values may 
outweigh the positive utility the organ market offers.  
Both of these arguments, as well as other arguments in relation to 
externalities, mainly ask an empirical question, and a satisfactory answer can only 
be provided through empirical research. In the following discussion, I refer to the 
existing studies on these questions to evaluate the strength and validity of these 
objections. 
 
A. The Crowding-Out Effect 
 
The first objection is based on the crowding-out effect. It is argued that the 
change from a non-incentivized system to an incentivized system would not 
increase the number of suppliers. Instead of keeping the number of existing 
suppliers who would be willing to make their organs available under the non-
incentivized systems and adding to this number new suppliers who only make 
their organs available in return for benefits, the organ market would end up losing 
a substantial amount of the existing suppliers. The idea behind this objection is 
the following: People who decide to participate in organ transplantation under the 
non-incentivized systems do so because they derive happiness from the idea that 
they are acting altruistically and helping others by saving their lives. However, in 
an incentive-driven system, such as an organ market, this act loses its ‘heroic’ 




This change in the character of the act will exclude the suppliers in the non-
incentivized systems and end up recruiting a new set of people, which may not be 
necessarily larger than the previous set. 
An early formulation of this objection can be found in Titmuss’s book on 
blood donations. In The Gift Relationship, Titmuss argues for an altruism-driven 
system, claiming that financial incentives give rise to the crowding-out effect. 
This is ultimately an empirical question. Since Titmuss, there have been many 
studies conducted on the effects of incentives, and the available evidence strongly 
suggests that crowding-out of altruistic donors will not happen, or at least that it 
will be dominated by the increase in supply from other, financially motivated 
donors. The argument can be evaluated by asking two questions: First, which 
group of potential donors is likely to be affected by the incentives? Second, how 
would incentives play a role? 
 
Effects on Altruistic and Directed Donors 
 
In 2010 and 2011, in the United States, there were in total 366 
anonymous—that is, altruistic, non-directed—kidney donors. This accounts for 
3% of all living kidney transplants and only about 1.1% of all transplants, where 
the number of all transplants in 2011 accounts only for 18.3% of the patients 
waiting for a kidney.71 While each kidney donation is a crucial contribution to a 
specific patient’s life, given the percentage of altruistic donors in relation to the 
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number of patients on the waiting list, the worry that incentives would decrease 
the number of altruistic donations shows that the risk of crowding-out is not a risk 
with high costs. On the contrary, if there is a considerable chance that incentives 
can increase the number of suppliers—both altruistically and financially 
motivated—then a decrease in the number of existing altruistic donors is a risk 
that can reasonably be taken. 
On the other hand, the objection from crowding-out can be formulated 
also by focusing on the directed donors. According to this objection, the option of 
buying an organ would make the would-be directed donors prefer going for the 
market, resulting in a decrease in the total number of directed donors. This will 
cause more patients to be added to the waiting list, forcing the commercialized 
system to accommodate the patients who could have had a donor in a non-
commercial system. The objection claims that a patient’s family and friends, who 
would be willing to donate their organs, now would be unwilling because given 
the commercial options, they do not see themselves under the obligation as they 
would have in a system of donation where they are the last resort for saving the 
patient’s life.  
This argument causes a problem in the utilitarian evaluation of 
incentivized systems if and only if this change in attitude of would-be suppliers 
causes the gap between suppliers and recipients to be larger than in a non-
incentivized system. In an incentivized system, either there will be enough organs 
to eliminate the waiting list or the supply will remain somewhat short of the 




becomes irrelevant. If the supply in the incentivized system does not meet the 
demand, then there are always other factors—such as priority on the waiting list, 
finding a good match, or having the adequate insurance—that determine whether 
or not a particular patient will be able to receive an organ. Here, if it turns out that 
the market cannot provide an organ for the patient in a reasonable time period, the 
would-be directed donors become again the sole lifesaving options, and the same 
motivation they have in the non-incentivized system should apply under these 
circumstances. Hence, the recipient who has a donor does not lose her chance to 
survive in an organ market. On the other hand, since the incentivized system is 
expected to recruit more non-directed suppliers, the recipient without a potential 
directed donor now acquires an increased chance of survival.  
 
Role of Incentives 
 
Having laid out how directed and non-directed potential donors may be 
affected by the incentives, now we can turn to the second point of the argument, 
which is the link between the incentives and the crowding-out effect. The 
argument suggests that once the incentives are introduced, the potential donor 
decides not to donate her organ given that, in an incentivized system, her act loses 
its character as an altruistic action.72 A response to this is found in a Swedish 
                                                 
72 A Swiss study on the effects of compensation in relation to the “Not In My Backyard” problem 
supports this position by concluding that while 50.8% of citizens accept accommodating a nuclear 
waste repository in their neighborhood without compensation, once the compensation is 
introduced, this number drops down to 24.6%. See, Bruno S. Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 
“The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out,” The 




study that shows that crowding-out can be eliminated with simple design 
enhancement. The study compares blood donation rates under three options: no 
incentive, receiving $7 for donation, and the option of choosing to receive $7 or to 
donate this money to a charity. It concludes that while the group that is offered 
incentives show less willingness to donate any blood, by adding the option of 
donating the money to the charity, this crowding-out effect is fully counteracted 
in the third group.73 Adding the option of charity seems trivial given that any 
supplier would be free to give any money received to charity anyway. But the 
study suggests that having the option stated explicitly influences the individual’s 
decision. According to this study, there is no major gain in the number of 
suppliers from adding the incentives (with the option of charity) but this may well 
be due to the unattractiveness of the incentive ($7 for giving blood).  
While the money offered in the Swedish study may be inadequate to act as 
an incentive for the time and discomfort involved in blood donations, another 
study suggests that the increase in supply in kidneys from commercialization 
would be very substantial even at relatively low prices. Using the U.S. data on 
risks involved in kidney transplantation and the value judgments expressed in 
2005 dollars, the study argues that at about $15,200 per donor, “a very large 
supply of live kidney donors would be available.”74 This relatively low price is 
calculated by taking into consideration the risk of death, the time lost during 
recovery, and the risk of reduced life quality in kidney transplantation and the 
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estimates are based on the “economic research on individuals’ willingness to take 
on risk; the low mortality risk of kidney and liver donations; the expected change 
in quality of life; and the short recovery period.”75  
This conclusion that, with adequate incentives, commercialization is able 
to increase the number of available organs considerably is also in line with other 
empirical results. Surveys on the likely effects of incentives show that incentives 
increase the likelihood of making an organ available.76 The crowding-out 
argument is ultimately an empirical argument, and its validity depends on the 
available evidences. The existing evidence suggests that the number of altruistic 
donations is already extremely low, and incentives have the capacity to increase 
the overall number of available organs as long as they are determined and offered 
adequately. To conclude, the empirical evidence does not suggest a necessary link 
between incentives and the crowding-out effect unlike the assumption that 
Titmuss’s argument relies on. 
 
B. Social Preferences 
  
A group of arguments against an organ market refer to the social norms 
that people value, and claim that an organ market would reduce the overall utility 
by conflicting with these values. The claim is that people derive happiness and 
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satisfaction from living in a society where the promoted and condemned values 
match the people’s views on these values. The objection suggests that organ 
market may give rise to a dissatisfaction and unhappiness by causing a conflict 
between what people value and what society endorses by allowing an organ 
market. It is argued that, for example, allowing an organ market indicates that the 
values such as altruism and solidarity are being replaced with a monetary 
transaction, treating human body as a commodity.77 This change in social values 
may result in a lower overall utility, the argument suggests, given people’s 
unhappiness and dissatisfaction of living in a society, that promotes values that 
people disagree with. 
This objection can be taken in two forms: appearance and substance. The 
first formulation, which is based on appearance, suggests that the society 
associates certain acts with certain values even though the association is not 
necessary and is unclear. In the example of organ transplantation, this would 
present itself in social understanding that giving a kidney without receiving any 
benefits in return demonstrates altruism and solidarity, whereas providing a 
kidney in return for material benefits shows selfishness. Even though it can be 
argued that donating a kidney is likely to be related to the values of altruism and 
solidarity, selling a kidney does not show the lack of these values. The person 
who sells a kidney may still have the best interest of the patient in mind while 
believing that other values such as justice or reciprocity would allow her to accept 
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material benefits in return for this good deed. Alternatively, the person may desire 
to distribute the benefits to more people by accepting the money from a recipient 
who can afford it and giving it to those who are in financial need. On the other 
hand, a non-incentivized system does not guarantee altruistic acts since a kidney 
donor may also act on selfish reasons such as promoting her image within her 
social circle. And finally, the organ market does not prohibit individuals from 
donating their organs. Hence, allowing incentives does not necessarily eliminate 
social values such as altruism or solidarity, on the contrary, it may uphold even 
more social values such as justice, reciprocity, and charity.  
This formulation of the objection shows that the problem is essentially one 
of appearance, and the society does not actually lose the values that people derive 
happiness and satisfaction from. Hence, with the right presentation and 
clarification of the policy, the problem of dissatisfaction can be eliminated. On the 
other hand, the second formulation assumes that the policy change actually causes 
a conflict in social values leading to people’s unhappiness and dissatisfaction. If, 
for example, people have a strong reaction against the involvement of money in 
organ transplantation, then they will necessarily be unhappy and dissatisfied with 
the introduction of an organ market.  
In such a case, the answer again relies on the empirical evidence, which 
requires a comparison between the utility gained by saving the lives of the 
recipients and by meeting the needs and desires of the suppliers and the utility lost 
by endorsing the undesirable social values. While it is possible that the frustration 




that results from an organ market, that seems to be an unlikely scenario. In the 
case of an organ market, since the utility gain is likely to be extremely high, 
involving thousands of lives, the dissatisfaction resulting from endorsing 
monetary transaction needs to be very high to generate an overall negative utility. 
Also, it seems like the negative value judgment on the practice of an organ market 
is misplaced, given that similar practices already exist without causing extreme 
dissatisfaction or unhappiness in the society. Such extreme dissatisfaction cannot 
arise from the social endorsement of paying for body parts, given that it is already 
an accepted practice to pay for various body parts such as eggs, semen, and hair. 
On the other hand, if the dissatisfaction arises from the possibility that the 
extremely poor will take risks and endure the unpleasant procedure, it must be 
recalled that this is also an already existing practice since the risky and unpleasant 




In the discussion of incentives in organ transplantation, the utilitarian 
analysis proves that a prohibition against an organ market cannot be justified on 
moral grounds. For an individual, selling an organ does not necessarily maximize 
the overall utility, yet it is quite possible that given the circumstances, it turns out 
to be the morally right action. Hence, for the individual to have the chance to 
maximize utility, the option of selling an organ needs to be available. A 




bolder claim, stating that a regulated organ market is the system that is most likely 
to maximize the overall utility. Therefore, it is the morally right choice for policy. 
Two main objections against organ market aim to show that the organ market is 
likely to reduce overall utility; however, they fail to make a strong case. The 
utilitarian analysis is mainly based on empirical evidence and predictions. The 
existing evidence and study results do not support the claims that are put forward 

























 In this chapter, I evaluate the claim that an organ market necessarily 
entails immoral actions with respect to Kant’s categorical imperative. I argue that 
(necessary behavior in) an organ market does not violate the categorical 
imperative. Quite the contrary, the categorical imperative requires permitting a 
regulated organ market, that is, any prohibition against organ market is morally 
impermissible.  
All Kantian moral rules derive from the categorical imperative, “a law of 
pure reason applying to the will.”78 Kant presents the categorical imperative in 
various formulations, claiming they all refer to the same fundamental moral 
principle one must follow.79 Among these, Kant emphasizes two—the formula of 
universal law and the formula of humanity—by applying them to four cases.80 
Whether these formulas are equivalent or represent different aspects of the 
categorical imperative has been a subject of controversy among Kant scholars.81 
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Refraining from taking sides on this discussion, I evaluate the systems of organ 
transplantation separately in relation to the formula of universal law and to the 
formula of humanity.  
 In a much-quoted passage from the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant 
condemns not only organ sale but also any type of organ transplantation.82 He 
claims, 
To deprive oneself of an integral organ (to maim oneself)—for example, to 
give away or sell a tooth to be transplanted into another’s mouth, or to have 
oneself castrated in order to get an easier livelihood as a singer, and so forth—
are ways of partially murdering oneself. But to have a dead or diseased organ 
amputated when it endangers one’s life, or to have something cut off that is a 
part but not an organ of the body, for example, one’s hair, cannot be counted 
as a crime against one’s own person—although cutting one’s hair in order to 
sell it is not altogether free from blame.83 
 
Kant puts this claim in relation to treating oneself as a mere means, which is 
morally impermissible according to the formula of humanity. 
As I argue in this chapter, this claim, like Kant’s other statements against 
organ transplantation, cannot be justified in a coherent interpretation of his ethical 
theory.84 The claim rests on the idea that one cannot forgo one’s healthy body 
parts to achieve another end. This seems in tension with Kant’s own evaluation of 
other situations, in particular his endorsement in his Lectures in Ethics of a 
                                                 
82 Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys, 147; Mario Morelli, “Commerce in Organs: A Kantian Critique,” 
Journal of Social Philosophy 30, issue 2 (1999): 318, doi: 10.1111/0047-2786.00020; Thomas M. 
Powers, “The Integrity of Body: Kantian Moral Constraints on the Physical Self,” Philosophy and 
Medicine 60, sec. 3 (2002): 219, doi: 10.1007/0-306-46866-2_9. 
83 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), 219. 
84 In particular, Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, trans. 




circumcision if otherwise the person will be condemned to death.85 I do not need 
to explore this tension further, however, because I shall argue that Kant’s claim 
against organ transplantation is based on an overly broad interpretation of Kant’s 
own notion of “humanity.” While Kant’s ethical theory puts the human rational 
nature as the core of humanity, Kant’s claims about forgoing body parts 
understands this notion almost equal to the human body and bodily integrity, 
rendering any organ transaction—including donation—morally impermissible.  
This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I argue that, 
being based on the rational nature, the formula of humanity properly understood 
only objects to certain (mis-)treatment of others’ and one’s own ability to set and 
pursue ends. It follows that, contrary to Kant’s assertion, donating or selling an 
organ does not necessarily violate one’s humanity. Only transplantations from 
coerced or manipulated individuals, and transplantations that damage the 
individual’s rational capacity, are morally impermissible under the formula of 
humanity. This understanding of humanity also provides a basis to analyze Kant’s 
idea of dignity and how it relates to an organ market. I argue that dignity, being 
ascribed to human capacity for rationality, does not object to commercial 
transaction of organs. The formula of universal law leads to the same conclusion 
through the analysis of the plausible maxims that the participants of the organ 
market can hold. I argue that both recipients’ and suppliers’ maxims in an organ 
market are universalizable without contradictions. Hence, both recipients’ and 
suppliers’ actions are morally permissible. 
                                                 





In section two, I go further and claim that far from morally condemning 
organ sales, the formula of humanity actually requires that organ sales be allowed. 
The formula of humanity requires that people treat the rational nature as an end in 
itself. This entails an imperfect duty to contribute to the advancement of rational 
capacity, and preserving one’s life in morally permissible ways is an indirect duty 
that enables one to follow this imperfect duty. While there are generally many 
ways of doing so, buying an organ becomes the only way to fulfill this imperfect 
duty when the person’s organ fails and a donation is not forthcoming. Thus, 
prohibiting morally permissible organ sales makes it impossible to fulfill an 
imperfect duty in certain situations. Such a prohibition, therefore, violates the 
formula of humanity. 
 
I. Moral Permissibility of a Regulated Organ Market 
 
The claim that an organ market necessarily entails immoral actions cannot 
be justified in the framework of Kantian ethics. In the Kantian framework, 
individuals’ actions are judged by the maxims that underlie them. The maxims are 
determined to be morally permissible or impermissible depending on their 
conformity to the demands of the categorical imperative. Hence, in order to check 
the validity of the claim against the organ market, it is necessary to evaluate the 
possible and plausible maxims of individuals who participate in organ 
transplantation in relation to the formulas. In this section, I will put forward the 




evaluate these maxims using Kant’s formulas of humanity and universal law. I 
will argue that both the recipients and the suppliers can act on morally permissible 
maxims and participate in a commercial transaction of organs without violating 
the categorical imperative. 
 
A. Formula of Humanity 
 
The formula of humanity states that you must “act that you use humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time 
as an end, never merely as a means.”86 The formula thus has two components: 
Never treat humanity as a mere means, and always treat it also as an end. Kant 
categorizes the duties that arise from this division under two types: perfect and 
imperfect duties. One has a perfect duty, a duty “that admits no exception in favor 
of inclination,” not to treat humanity as a mere means.87 And one has an imperfect 
duty to treat humanity as an end in itself.88 If one’s maxim, “the subjective 
principle of volition,”89 does not violate any of these duties, then it is morally 
permissible to endorse that maxim. 
Kant uses four examples to illustrate how the formula of humanity judges 
a maxim’s moral status. As examples of maxims that treat humanity as a mere 
means and hence violate a perfect duty, Kant cites the maxims of suicide and of 
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making false promises.90 In the suicide case, one is disposing of oneself in order 
to avoid intolerable conditions. In the case of making false promises, one is 
deceiving another in order to benefit oneself. By contrast, the maxims of never 
furthering one’s talents and never helping others do not treat humanity as a mere 
means, and hence do not violate a perfect duty. However, they violate the 
imperfect duty of treating humanity as an end in itself. A maxim treats humanity 
as an end by harmonizing with it and furthering it as an end.91 What Kant means 
by this becomes clearer in his examples. Furthering one’s talents is an imperfect 
duty because not doing so fails to further humanity, which has “predispositions to 
greater perfection, which belong to the end of nature with respect to humanity in 
our subject.”92 Similarly, by not helping others, one fails to treat humanity in 
others as an end in itself, since “ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as 
far as possible be also my ends.”93 The imperfect duty in relation to humanity is a 
positive and affirmative approach to the humanity committed to its furtherance, 
such as the furtherance of its capacities and the ends of others. By not helping 
others and not furthering one’s own talents, one fails to contribute to the 
advancement of humanity. In all four examples, endorsing these maxims is 
morally impermissible because the maxim violates a perfect or imperfect duty. 
Kant’s application of the formula of humanity in these examples is not 
free from controversy. Nevertheless, it helps illustrate how the formula of 
humanity works as a guiding principle for action. At first glance, the formula of 
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humanity seems to provide grounds for arguing against organ transplantation in 
any form with the understanding that the organ transplantation necessarily uses 
one human being in order to save another, which would be a violation of a perfect 
duty, which claims that one can never use humanity as a mere means. However, a 
deeper look reveals the actual scope of the formula’s demands and shows that 
according to the formula of humanity, neither organ transplantation in general nor 
organ sale in particular necessarily involves morally impermissible maxims. 
Kant’s employment of humanity does not simply refer to the human 
person by virtue of her belonging to the species. Instead, it derives the value of 
humanity from the human capacity for rationality and ability to set ends and to 
pursue them.94 In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes, “The capacity to set 
oneself an end—any end whatsoever—is what characterizes humanity (as 
distinguished from animality).”95 A coherent collection of Kant’s use of the 
concept of humanity also supports the idea that this concept refers to rationality 
and the capacity to set ends.96 Therefore, the formula of humanity concerns the 
treatment of this rational capacity. It demands that this rational capacity be 
acknowledged by prohibiting its impairment and by promoting its development—
in other words, by never treating humanity as a mere means and always treating it 
as an end.97 
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Application to Non-Incentivized Systems 
  
 A typical supplier in kidney donation is not likely to be willing to put his 
life in great danger except in donations with special relations such as parent–child 
donations. Hence, in a non-incentivized system of kidney transplantation, the 
maxim that the supplier acts on can be plausibly formulated as “I will give my 
organ to save someone’s life if I value helping a person more than the negative 
consequences of transplantation on me as long as the procedure is not likely to 
cause my death or to impair my brain functions.” On the other hand, a typical 
recipient in a system of kidney donation, where the system has the basic 
requirement of ensuring the participant’s voluntary, informed, and rational 
decision, would have the luxury of not worrying about the well-being of the 
supplier and trust the supplier’s offer is not coerced or extremely risky. If this is 
so, the recipient’s most plausible maxim can be formulated as “I will accept 
organs to save my life from those who want to give their organs by their 
voluntary, informed, and rational choice as long as the procedure is not likely to 
cause the supplier’s death or to impair the supplier’s brain functions.”  
 Does such a transaction violate the formula of humanity? It might be 
argued that it does because the recipient uses the supplier simply as a means for 
an end—namely, to stay alive. If this argument were accepted, not only the 
recipient’s act but also the supplier’s act would be impermissible since the 




Such an evaluation of organ transplantation would fail to fully grasp the 
maxims that are involved in this transaction and the actual demand of the formula 
of humanity. First, let us look at the supplier’s position. The transaction occurs 
through the free will and rational decision of the supplier. The supplier makes an 
informed, rational, and voluntary decision to give her organ in order to save 
another person’s life. The supplier’s maxim stated above does not violate the 
formula of humanity by treating her own or another’s rationality and rational 
capacity as a mere means or by failing to treat her own or another’s rationality 
and rational capacity as an end. Her act does not damage or interfere with rational 
capacity of anyone, and it contributes to the advancement of rational capacity by 
saving the recipient’s life. 
 The key distinction here is that the formula of humanity is mainly 
concerned with the rationality and rational capacity and not with the body and 
bodily integrity. The most coherent interpretation of Kant’s wide usage of the 
concept of humanity throughout his works shows the strong connection between 
humanity and rational nature, but almost no substantial evidence of the connection 
between bodily integrity and humanity. The formula of humanity is focused on 
the treatment of “the capacity to take a rational interest in something”98 or in other 
words, of “only those powers necessarily associated with rationality and ‘the 
power to set ends.’”99 Of course, this does not mean that Kantian ethics gives no 
importance to bodily integrity. It only means that bodily integrity is not valued as 
‘humanity’ even if its value can be derived from other concepts.  
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Given the lack of direct connection between the body and the humanity, 
even though Kant states his position against giving an organ as quoted at the 
beginning of this chapter, within his own system, this position is unfounded. 
Giving a body part does not entail a violation of one’s humanity.100 Therefore, 
any objection that is brought from the formula of humanity against organ 
transplantation has to be directed against the rational nature of the participants and 
not simply to their body parts. 
 This distinction between body and rationality suggests that the recipient’s 
act of accepting the organ does not violate her duties towards others. The recipient 
acts on the maxim of saving her life by accepting an organ from those who are 
willingly offering without greatly endangering their lives or their mental 
capacities. By acting on this maxim, the recipient does not treat the supplier as a 
mere means, given that the supplier’s offer is based on her rational decision and 
the recipient does not manipulate or deceive the supplier into making her organ 
available; she simply accepts the supplier’s offer. By not interfering with the 
rational capacity of the supplier and by respecting her decision to pursue this end, 
the recipient does not treat the supplier as a mere means to her survival but, on the 
contrary, treats her as an end by contributing to her rationally adopted end. The 
recipient clearly also does not violate her perfect or imperfect duties to herself in 
relation to the formula of humanity; she does not treat herself as a mere means, 
and moreover, she treats herself as an end by saving her life and saving her 
rational capacity.  
                                                 
100 There can be an argument against giving a part of one’s brain since even if we assume the 
person can survive, if the person loses her rational capacity, she will be violating the formula of 




Application to Incentivized Systems 
 
In incentivized systems, the recipient’s maxim remains the same, but the 
supplier’s maxim changes to “I will sell my organ to save someone’s life if I 
value helping a person and/or the material benefits of selling my organ more than 
the negative consequences of transplantation on me as long as the procedure is not 
likely to cause my death or impair my brain functions.” This maxim can give rise 
to three types of action: (1) acting with the motivation of helping others and 
benefiting oneself, (2) acting with the motivation of only benefiting oneself, and 
(3) acting with the motivation of only helping others. By acting out of one of 
these motivations, does the supplier treat the humanity in herself or in others as a 
mere means? 
In the first case, the supplier is motivated both by helping the recipient and 
by benefiting herself. By doing so, she does not treat the recipient as a mere 
means since she does not use the recipient’s rationality for her own ends. Her 
decision is influenced by the recipient’s desire to live, and the supplier aims to 
fulfill this desire while also benefiting herself. By helping the recipient to survive, 
the supplier also treats her as an end and contributes to the survival and 
advancement of her rational capacity.  
It can be argued that by accepting the benefits the supplier shows that she 
is not motivated by saving lives at all. Otherwise she would have simply rejected 
the incentives, and if not, she would have given the money to charity. This claim 




is paid, then one’s action is based on self-interest. However, this reasoning would 
also apply to other cases that we commonly consider as acts that are partially, but 
undeniably, motivated by saving lives. For example, professionals such as 
doctors, nurses, or fire fighters are considered as people who are mainly 
motivated by saving lives and helping others. Yet, if we apply the same argument, 
since they accept payments that are more than reimbursements, they cannot be 
motivated by helping others but only by self-interest. It can be argued that these 
professionals are not motivated by self-interest but they simply cannot always 
volunteer since they also need to somehow make a living. Yet, this would suggest 
that a payment that covers their needs for survival or bare minimum life standards 
would suffice if their acts are motivated by helping others. While this conclusion 
suggests that such people are not acting only out of the motivation of helping 
others, it also does not reject that they can act out of a mixed motivation that takes 
into account both helping others and benefiting themselves. It can be argued that a 
doctor who earns more than minimum money or a person who makes her organ 
available for money may not be acting on the maxim that says “I will save others’ 
lives,” but her maxim can include this motivation by saying “I will benefit myself 
in ways that will also help saving others’ lives.” 
In the second case, the supplier is motivated only by the incentives. It 
might be argued that this implies that the supplier treats the recipient only as a 
source for material gain, and hence as a mere means. The same argument would 
apply in the third case, where the supplier is motivated only by helping others, yet 




found in the kidney sale scandal of 1989 in England, where the supplier sold his 
kidney in order to buy lifesaving medication for his child.101 In such a case, even 
though the supplier is completely altruistically motivated just like the supplier in a 
non-incentivized system, it might be argued that her maxim aims to use the 
recipient as a mere means to earn money to help someone else. Hence, so the 
argument would go, she treats the recipient as a mere means to reach another goal. 
The preceding argument fails because it is based on an improper 
understanding of what it means to treat humanity as a mere means. Treating 
humanity as a mere means entails disregarding one’s own or someone else’s 
rational capacities. As long as the recipient makes a rational, informed, and 
voluntary decision to accept the organ, however, the supplier does not impair and 
make use of the recipient’s rational capacity for her own purposes. Even though 
the supplier treats the recipient as a means to gain personal benefits, it does not 
mean that the supplier treats the humanity in the recipient as a mere means. 
The formula of humanity does not prohibit one to treat another’s or one’s 
own humanity as a means to an end, but it prohibits the treatment of humanity 
merely as a means. Most human interaction is based on means–ends relationships. 
When I take a taxi, I treat the taxi driver as a means to my end—that is, reaching 
my destination. When I listen to lectures, I treat the lecturer as a means to my 
end—that is, learning. Thus, if it were prohibited to treat another person as a 
means, most of our daily activities would violate the moral law.  
Moral condemnation attaches only if one treats others as a mere means, 
ignoring their rational nature or obstructing their rational capacity. Forcing the 
                                                 




taxi driver to take me to my destination even though she already called it a day 
would be treating her merely as a means since I do not care about her decision and 
want to use her as a purely instrumental ‘thing.’ In such a case, I would be 
morally blameworthy for violating her rational nature. On the other hand, if the 
taxi driver wants to get some customers to pursue her end—that is, to earn 
money—then my act of taking the taxi treats the taxi driver as a means to my end 
as well as respecting her rational nature by allowing her to pursue her own ends. 
Returning to the case of incentivized organ donation, the supplier not only 
refrains from treating the recipient’s humanity as a mere means by engaging in a 
transaction where the recipient’s offer is rational, informed, and voluntary, but she 
also treats her humanity as an end in itself by saving her life and enabling the 
advancement of her rational capacity. The supplier’s maxim can violate the 
formula of humanity also if it allows the supplier to let her own humanity to be 
treated as a mere means or does not contribute to the advancement of her 
humanity. However, given that the supplier also makes a rational, informed, and 
voluntary decision and does not impair her future rational capacity, her 
humanity—namely, her rational nature—is not used as a mere means. Moreover, 
depending on her use of the benefits that she gains from this transaction, the 
supplier may further her rational capacities by enabling herself to set goals and 
pursue them. 
As for the recipient, her maxim remains the same in the incentivized 
system as in the non-incentivized system. She acts on her desire to save her life by 




put her life or her mental capabilities in great risk by giving her organ. As 
explained earlier, the recipient does not treat the humanity in her own person 
wrongly by acting on this maxim.  
It can be argued that the recipient violates the formula of humanity in her 
treatment of the supplier. The recipient does not care whose organ she receives as 
long as it serves her survival and hence uses the supplier as a mere means to her 
end. This argument fails in exactly the same manner as the previous argument 
about the supplier’s treatment of the recipient. Since the supplier makes a 
voluntary, rational, and informed decision, and since her rational capacity is not 
impaired by this transaction, there is no moral obligation generated by the formula 
of humanity for the recipient to reject the supplier’s offer to sell her organ. By 
providing benefits for the supplier, the recipient also possibly contributes to the 
advancement of the supplier’s rational capacity. 
 The focus on rationality in the discussion of organ transplantation does not 
entail that any act that is rational is morally permissible. In an act where one party 
makes a well thought-out and non-coerced decision to murder or rape another 
person, such an act cannot be morally permissible given that the other party—that 
is, the victim—does not agree to participate in this act. This is not the case in a 
regulated organ market, given that the rational, voluntary, and informed 
participation of both parties is ensured. Another type of action where the well 
thought-out and non-coerced decision of the individual does not render the act 
morally permissible refers to that, which is concerned with an act that is opposed 




terminate the rationality of an individual. Such an act would treat humanity—that 
is, the rational nature—wrongly.102 
 
Objection from Dignity 
 
 Another objection against an organ market frequently mentioned in 
connection with the formula of humanity is based on dignity. The basis for this 
objection is Kant’s statement “In the kingdom of ends everything has either a 
price or a dignity. What has a price can be replaced by something else as its 
equivalent; what on the other hand is raised above all price and therefore admits 
of no equivalent has a dignity.”103 Buying and selling organs, so the objection 
goes, treats humans as things that can be assigned prices and that can be replaced 
with another ‘thing,’ violating dignity. 
 Assessing this argument requires clarification of the notion of dignity. 
Kant describes dignity as “an unconditional, incomparable worth.”104 As 
discussed earlier, Kant’s idea that human beings are ‘ends in themselves’ and that 
humanity in persons must be respected emanates from his position on what makes 
humans distinct from things. His claim is that the distinguishing factor is the 
rational nature of humanity. Humans’ rational capacity allows them to set their 
own ends and to pursue them. He claims that “[a]utonomy is therefore the ground 
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of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”105 Because of this, 
they cannot be treated as things, which are instrumental, replaceable, and subject 
to others’ projects. Kant states that “morality is the condition under which alone a 
rational being can be an end in itself, since only through this it is possible to be a 
lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends. Hence morality, and humanity insofar 
as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.”106 To sum up, Kant’s 
understanding of dignity is based on the humanity’s capability of morality; and 
dignity, according to this understanding, is found in every human being with 
respect to her rational nature.107  
Having clarified what dignity is ascribed to—namely, rational nature—
now we can go back to the objection from dignity against a regulated organ 
market. The objection claims that organ sale violates the supplier’s dignity by 
treating her like an object. As I have emphasized, however, the supplier 
participates in organ transplantation through her informed, voluntary, and rational 
decision. Thus, the supplier, through her rational nature, sets her own ends (saving 
one’s life and/or receiving a sum of money) and pursues them. The supplier’s 
rational nature is respected by allowing her to pursue her morally permissible 
goals.  
The objection from dignity suggests that the “actions of the type ‘selling a 
tooth to increase comfort’ tend to promote a notion that is inconsistent with the 
idea that humanity has dignity, namely the notion that a person is available for the 
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right price for others to use as they will.”108 It is clear that putting a price to a 
person conflicts with the Kantian morality. One cannot sell a person at any price. 
However, the ground for this moral prohibition is rational nature, since this is 
what the dignity is ascribed to. By making a person available for the right price—
that is, by selling a person—one sells one’s capacity to set ends for oneself and to 
pursue them. On the other hand, this prohibition does not dictate one never to put 
a price to anything related to being a human. An accountant lends her rational 
ability to calculate in return for money. A taxi driver lends her ability to drive in 
return for money. A shoemaker lends her talent to make shoes in return for 
money. These are all human capacities, and it would be absurd to refuse to pay 
the providers by claiming that this would be assigning a price to their humanity 
and would violate their dignity. By being involved in these transactions, none of 
these people lose their dignity; on the contrary, they exercise their rational 
capacity by pursuing their ends. Similarly, selling a kidney or a tooth does not 
impair one’s rational capacity and hence, does not violate the supplier’s dignity. It 
can be argued that selling a body part differs from selling a capacity; however, it 
is unclear how this point is relevant to dignity since dignity is much more closely 
related to the human capacities than to human body parts unless the body part is 
what enables rationality, like the brain. 
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B. Formula of Universal Law 
 
The formula of universal law states that you must “act only in accordance 
with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a 
universal law.”109 Kant illustrates how this formula works with the same four 
examples as in his discussion of the formula of humanity. He asks whether the 
maxim generates contradictions once it becomes a “universal law of nature.”110 
He distinguishes two types of contradictions, with different moral implications. 
The first type is a conceptual contradiction (an “inner impossibility”), which 
occurs if it is not even possible to think of a world where all rational beings 
follow such a maxim.111 Maxims that generate this first type of contradiction 
result in a perfect duty to refrain from endorsing them at all times without any 
exceptions.112 If the maxim passes this step, then the second type of 
contradiction—a contradiction in the will, which occurs if it is impossible to will 
this maxim to be a universal law—may still arise.113 Maxims that fail only this 
second test result in an imperfect duty to refrain from endorsing them while 
admitting exceptions in favor of inclinations. Only maxims that generate neither 
contradiction are morally permissible and may form the basis of a moral act.114  
 To clarify how this method works, let us turn to two of Kant’s 
examples.115 According to Kant’s analysis, the maxim for making false promises 
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when one is in need fails the first round of the test. It generates a conceptual 
contradiction because once it is universalized, it becomes impossible to act on this 
maxim. Once every rational being makes false promises when in need, no one 
believes another’s word, making it impossible for the practice of promising to 
even make any sense. Kant calls this an “inner impossibility,” meaning that such a 
“maxim cannot even be thought without contradiction as a universal law of 
nature.”116 Since universalizing such a maxim causes conceptual contradiction—
that is, inner impossibility—according to the formula of universal law, refraining 
from making false promises is a perfect duty towards others—that is, a duty that 
should never be violated.  
By contrast, the maxim of never helping others does not generate a 
conceptual contradiction. As Kant points out, it is imaginable to have a world 
where no one helps another. Kant claims, however, that such a world cannot be 
willed and that “a will that decided this would conflict with itself.”117 
Consequently, Kant judges the maxim of never helping others impermissible and 
categorizes the maxim of helping others under the imperfect duties that one 
should strive to fulfill. 
What Kant means by the will contradicting itself is open to interpretation. 
One interpretation is that the rational will cannot oppose what enables one to 
reach one’s own happiness, because according to Kant, “the natural end that all 
human beings have is their own happiness.”118 The maxim of never helping 
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others, once universalized, would cause a contradiction in this sense because 
without help, we are unlikely to be happy.119  
Another interpretation appeals to the purpose of the will being 
“effectiveness in the pursuit of its ends, and its freedom to adopt and pursue new 
ends.”120 In the example, the maxim of never helping others fails because, once 
universalized, it opposes mutual cooperation, which supports the will’s 
effectiveness and freedom. Without help, it is unlikely that one will be able to 
pursue her ends as effectively as one would with help.  
 
Application to Non-Incentivized Systems 
 
As before, I assume that the supplier in non-incentivized systems acts on 
the maxim, “I will give my organ to save someone’s life if I value helping a 
person more than the negative consequences of transplantation on me as long as 
the procedure is not likely to cause my death or to impair my brain functions.” 
This maxim does not violate the formula of universal law. Clearly, there is no 
conceptual contradiction as in the example of making false promises. Nor is there 
a contradiction in the will. The maxim’s aim—saving lives—is in line with the 
purpose of the will, such as setting ends and pursuing them. The maxim preserves 
and promotes the will’s freedom and effectiveness.  
The same conclusion applies to the plausible maxim that the recipient is 
prepared to act on: “I will accept organs to save my life from those who want to 
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give their organs by their voluntary, informed, and rational choice as long as the 
procedure is not likely to cause the supplier’s death or to impair the supplier’s 
brain functions.” Again, the maxim does not cause any conceptual contradiction 
or contradiction in the will once it is universalized. Like the supplier’s maxim, 
this maxim aims to save lives (in this case, the individual’s own life) and by doing 
so supports the will’s purpose of being free and effective by ensuring the 
underlying condition—namely, the will’s existence.  
 
Application to Incentivized Systems 
 
The recipient’s maxim remains the same in the incentivized system. 
Therefore, its analysis in relation to the formula of universal law also remains the 
same. In any regulated system of organ transplantation, whether or not it is 
incentivized, where the participants are informed, voluntary, and rational, the 
recipient’s maxim of saving her life through an organ that is offered freely in 
exchange of money or as a gift does not cause any type of contradictions. 
By contrast, the supplier’s maxims in the incentivized systems require 
additional analysis. As I have already discussed, the supplier’s position in 
incentivized systems admits additional motivations as compared to non-
incentivized systems: “I will sell my organ to save someone’s life if I value 
helping a person and/or the material benefits of selling my organ more than the 
negative consequences of transplantation on me as long as the procedure is not 




may now act with the motivation of (1) only helping others, (2) only benefiting 
herself, and (3) helping others and benefiting herself. Clearly, none of these 
maxims causes a conceptual contradiction; and I shall argue here that none of 
them causes a contradiction in the will either. 
Since the supplier’s maxim in a non-incentivized system does not cause a 
contradiction in the will, in order for such a problem to arise in the incentivized 
system, there needs to be a relevant distinction between the maxims in the 
incentivized and non-incentivized systems. The first maxim in the incentivized 
system captures the same act with the same motivation as in the non-incentivized 
system, even though the people that the supplier prefers to help may vary (she 
may be motivated to use the money to help someone else). The second maxim 
replaces this altruistic motive with a self-centered motivation. And the third 
maxim allows both motivations to persist in the sense that the supplier is 
motivated both by saving the recipient’s life and by benefitting herself. The 
contradiction in will arises from the conflict between the aim of the maxim and 
the purpose of the will, which can be defined as effectiveness in pursuing ends 
and freedom to adopt and pursue ends121 or pursuing its natural end of 
happiness.122 Selling an organ in order to help others and/or to pursue one’s own 
ends does not conflict with the will’s purpose defined as such. 
The universalization of the first maxim does not differ significantly from 
the universalization of the supplier’s maxim in the non-incentivized system. Since 
it aims to help others, this maxim is in line with the will’s purposes. The second 
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maxim assumes that the supplier does not take into consideration any altruistic 
reasons for her action such as saving the recipient’s life or helping someone else, 
but she only acts for the benefits. This maxim, capturing the motivation and the 
action of the supplier in a transaction that involves two informed, rational, and 
voluntary parties, does not cause a contradiction in the will once it is 
universalized either. Since it leads to an act that serves the purpose of furthering 
both parties’ ends and provides them with means for adopting and pursuing new 
ends as well as their happiness, even if the supplier does not care about the 
recipient’s end, the maxim is still in line with the will’s purposes. And the third 
maxim poses a mixed motivation for the supplier’s act. In this case, the supplier’s 
motive is to benefit herself while helping others. In other words, her maxim aims 
at furthering both her own and others’ ends. A world where all rational persons 
are willing to give their organs to benefit themselves and others would harmonize 
with the will’s purpose of effectiveness in pursuing ends, freedom to adopt new 
ends, and pursuing its natural end of happiness. 
 
II. Moral Impermissibility of a Prohibition 
 
In the previous section, I refuted the claim that an organ market 
necessarily entails immoral actions within the framework of the Kantian ethics. 
Consequently, Kantian ethics does not provide a reason to prohibit a regulated 
organ market. In this section, I ask a more ambitious question: Does Kantian 




would the prohibition of an organ market be morally impermissible in Kantian 
framework? 
I shall answer this question in the affirmative. The core of my answer will 
be my argument that the recipient has an imperfect duty to promote her health and 
survival. If this is accepted, prohibiting regulated purchases of organs is morally 
wrong because it interferes with the recipient’s only way of fulfilling her duty. 
Purchasing an organ is the recipient’s only choice if her health will likely 
deteriorate significantly without a transplant and a donation is not forthcoming. A 
prohibition that stops this transaction would require a morally wrong act on the 
part of the person who interferes with the recipient’s act.  
The argument of this section is not just a simple corollary of the previous 
section’s argument. The previous section showed that participants’ maxims in a 
regulated organ market do not necessarily violate the categorical imperative. But 
this analysis does not by itself entail any duty to endorse these maxims. To derive 
such a duty, we need to consider the maxims’ negations. As Kant’s examples 
implicitly show, for something to be a duty, its negation should violate the 
categorical imperative.123 According to Kant’s analysis, refraining from making 
false promises and helping others are duties because their negations (i.e., making 
false promises and never helping others) fail the test for universalization and fail 
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to treat humanity as an end in itself. In what follows, I therefore consider the 
negations of the maxims of the participants of systems of organ transplantation. 
 
A. Negation of the Supplier’s Maxim 
 
I will begin with the negation of the supplier’s maxim. I will suggest that 
there is an imperfect duty to provide an organ, but there is no duty specifically to 
do so in a sale if and because donation remains an alternative. Consequently, the 
supplier’s duty would morally oppose a prohibition of any organ transplantation, 




The negation of the supplier’s maxim in non-incentivized systems can be 
precisely formulated as “I value helping a person more than the negative 
consequences of transplantation on me and the procedure is not likely to cause my 
death or impair my brain functions, but I will not give my organ to save 
someone’s life.” For purposes of the analysis below, the following simpler maxim 
can be assumed equivalent: “I will never give my organ to save someone’s life.” 
Such a maxim violates both the formula of humanity and the formula of universal 





The maxim of never giving an organ violates the formula of humanity 
because it does not treat humanity as an end. By endorsing this maxim, the 
individual refrains from furthering others’ ends and fails to contribute to the 
rational capacity to set ends and pursue them. In fact, she allows this capacity to 
diminish in another person.  
The maxim violates the formula of universal law by causing a 
contradiction in the will. In many cases, the survival of an individual depends on 
receiving an organ. Hence a person’s will which has a purpose of effectiveness 
and freedom of setting and pursuing ends or of pursuing happiness will contradict 





The same analysis does not hold for the negation of the supplier’s maxim 
in the incentivized system. Here the negation states that one will never sell one’s 
organ to save someone’s life. But this is neither a failure to treat humanity as an 
end in itself nor a contradiction in the will because one can always simply give 
one’s organ in order to save someone’s life. As long as donation is an option, not 
selling one’s organ does not mean that one endorses the inevitability of death 
once somebody has an organ failure. One can equally well contribute to the 




consistently will a universal law prohibiting organ sales since individuals can 
avoid death from organ failure by accepting an organ donation.  
 
B. Negation of the Recipient’s Maxim 
 
I now move on to consider the negation of the recipient’s maxim. I shall 
argue that the negation would violate the categorical imperative, implying an 
imperfect duty to receive an organ by whatever morally permissible means is 
available, including purchase. In fact, this duty will often narrow down to a duty 
to purchase if and because donations are not forthcoming, leaving purchase as the 
only way of fulfilling the duty. This is the crucial difference to the supplier’s case: 
Unlike the supplier, the recipient does not have the luxury of choosing between 
donation and purchase. 
The basic argument for the recipient’s duty to accept an organ mirrors the 
discussion of the supplier’s duty to give an organ. Complications arise, however, 
from Kant’s view that acting from duty and from inclination are incompatible. 
This might be understood to mean that the recipient, being naturally inclined to 
save her life by accepting the organ, is not under a duty after all. I will consider 









The recipient’s maxim is the same in incentivized and non-incentivized 
systems. The precise negation of this maxim is, “The procedure is not likely to 
cause the supplier’s death or impairment of brain functions and I will not accept 
organs to save my life from those who want to give their organs by their 
voluntary, informed and rational choice.” Again, for purposes of the analysis, the 
following simpler maxim can be assumed equivalent, “I will never accept organs 
to save my life.” 
This maxim violates the formula of humanity and the formula of universal 
law in the same way that I have presented in the supplier’s case. The difference 
that the recipient would harm her own life rather than someone else’s is 
immaterial under both formulas.124 The formula of humanity does not 
differentiate between the treatment of humanity in others, on the one hand, and in 
oneself, on the other. Hence, in allowing oneself to die, one fails to treat humanity 
as an end in itself in the same way as one would in allowing someone else to die. 
In relation to the formula of universal law, one can claim that a will that allows its 
own termination causes a contradiction in the will given that the will’s purpose is 
to set and pursue ends and to pursue its natural end of happiness.  
However, the parallels between the analyses of the negations of the 
supplier’s and recipient’s maxims end here. The supplier can choose between 
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various ways of making her organ available and, by doing so, act on her imperfect 
duty to provide her organ. By contrast, for the recipient, buying an organ may be 
the only way to fulfill her imperfect duty. If it is the case that a commercial 
transaction of organs can be done in a morally permissible way (which is the case, 
as I have shown in the previous section) and any other system fails to provide the 
necessary organ for the recipient (which is the case under the current system of 
donation, as I have shown in Chapter 2), then her imperfect duty demands that she 




 In the preceding analysis, I have omitted a possible complication arising 
from Kant’s view on duties and inclinations. Kant argues that an action done from 
inclination does not carry the same moral worth as an act done out of duty.125 In 
particular, Kant claims that preserving one’s life is a duty but usually also an 
inclination. Hence, in most cases, an individual’s act of taking “anxious care” 
does not have any “inner worth” and any “moral content” since it is not done 
“from duty” but only “in conformity with duty.”126 If one does not have an 
inclination to preserve one’s life, however, doing so out of duty is morally 
worthy.127 Applied to organ transplantation, this would mean that a recipient who 
desires to live does not act “from duty” in accepting a transplant. Only the 
                                                 






recipient who does not want to live and yet accepts a transplant acts with moral 
worth. 
 There are two ways to understand this interaction of duty and inclination. 
One way is to view duty and inclination as co-existing. In this view, the individual 
inclined to perform a morally required act may not be motivated by duty but still 
fulfills a duty in performing the act. As Kant puts it, such an individual may 
perform the act “in conformity with duty but not from duty.”128 In this 
interpretation, the individual’s duty persists regardless of inclination, and the 
basic moral argument against a prohibition of an organ market put forth above 
goes through unchanged. 
There is another way of understanding the interaction of duty and 
inclination, however, that would complicate the moral argument against 
prohibition. Inclination might displace duty; in this view, inclination and duty 
could not co-exist. I shall call this exclusivity. Under exclusivity, recipients who 
want to receive a transplant do not have a duty to do so, and hence a prohibition 
would not interfere with their duties. Under exclusivity, then, the argument 
against prohibition would have to proceed along one of two different routes. 
 One route is to appeal to the treatment of recipients who are prepared to 
give up life (hence, those who lack the inclination). Even under exclusivity, these 
recipients do have a duty to accept an organ from a willing supplier.  
 Another route is to appeal to Kant’s idea of indirect duties. An indirect 
duty is one that does not itself derive from the formulas but facilitates the 
fulfillment of other duties that do. As an example, Kant mentions the indirect duty 





not to treat animals cruelly (serving the direct duty of not treating humans cruelly 
since one may develop a natural disposition for cruelty),129 “to cultivate the 
compassionate natural feelings in us” (serving the direct duty to sympathize 
actively in the fate of those who are less fortunate)130 and to promote one’s own 
happiness (serving the direct duty to promote others’ happiness).131 Indirect duties 
foster a certain attitude (as in the case of avoiding cruelty and cultivating 
compassion) and remove obstacles that may distract one from one’s duties (as in 
the case of promoting one’s own happiness so that one does not get tempted to 
violate one’s duty to promote others’ happiness because of “adversity, pain, and 
want”).132 They are not ends themselves but they are merely means—permitted 
means—for removing obstacles to morality.133 
 Along these lines, preserving life may not be a direct duty for those who 
are inclined to do so, but it is an indirect duty that would allow the individual to 
pursue moral ends. By staying alive, the individual supports her own rational and 
moral nature as well as allowing herself to pursue her direct duties such as helping 
others. Moreover, one’s pursuit of health can also qualify as an indirect duty for 
the same reasons. An unhealthy person will have many obstacles that may lead 
her to disregard her direct duties, and by pursuing her health, she indirectly 
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pursues the end of acting morally.134 Applied to the case of organ transplantation, 
this argument suggests that even those who are naturally inclined to pursue their 
survival and their health have a duty—an indirect duty—to promote their survival 
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 Virtue ethics is a moral framework that emphasizes the agent’s moral 
character as opposed to the consequences or the rules. This implies that 
application of virtue ethics to judging the moral status of actions is not as clear as 
other moral frameworks.135 Consequently, virtue ethics cannot evaluate policies 
simply by looking at each action by itself. Perhaps for this reason, virtue ethics 
rarely enters the discussion of organ market.136 Virtue ethicists have worked on 
ways, however, to overcome this problem and to apply the theory to the 
evaluation of certain practices.137 One of the most explicit and coherent attempts 
is Rosalind Hursthouse’s “Virtue Ethics and Abortion,” and I will mostly rely on 
her model in my analysis of an organ market. 
According to virtue ethics, an action is morally right only if it corresponds 
to what a virtuous agent—an agent who exercises virtues—would do in given 
circumstances. Virtues are the character traits that one needs in order to attain 
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human flourishing (eudaimonia), the supreme good for oneself.138 Virtue ethics 
thus builds a conceptual connection between the right action and virtuous agent, 
and between virtue and flourishing.139 While this conceptual link allows the virtue 
ethicists to provide an answer to the objection that virtue ethics cannot be action 
guiding, it does not completely solve the problem. Many criticisms are directed at 
the absence of a method for balancing competing virtues, the epistemic problem 
of knowing what a virtuous agent would do, the emphasis on virtues as character 
traits that are both ontologically questionable and do not form a necessary link 
with a particular action in any given situation, and the moral relativity problem 
given that the value and substance of virtues vary between different cultures.140 
These problems pose serious concerns about how to employ virtue ethics for 
decision making. Virtue ethics provides neither an algorithm for determining the 
moral action—as utilitarianism and Kantian ethics—nor a check list for moral 
concerns—as principlism. 
Virtue ethics does not necessarily lead to a single morally right action for 
each circumstance. According to virtue ethics, more than one action can be right, 
unlike, for example, in the utilitarian framework.141 Since there is no clear rule of 
prioritizing between the relevant virtues, it is not possible to simply follow virtues 
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as one follows absolute rules. To understand the relevant virtues in a given 
situation, to balance them and prioritize them, requires practical wisdom.142 Two 
virtuous agents can act differently under the same circumstances; there can be 
more than one ‘good’ choice. In particular, two virtuous agents can act differently 
without finding each other’s actions morally wrong.143 I shall argue below that 
this openness to diversity translates into an argument for having more options, 
which gives the virtuous agent the ability to act on the virtues that she finds 
appropriate and relevant, so as to provide virtuous agent the opportunity to pursue 
her human flourishing with incentivized or non-incentivized transactions. 
In relation to the claim whether a particular system necessarily entails 
immoral actions, the moral status of actions need to be judged. Hursthouse 
focuses on a specific agent-based question to make this judgment: By committing 
this action, would the agent be acting virtuously or viciously or neither?144 In this 
sense, to address controversial practices such as abortion or organ sale, virtue 
ethics must appeal to the participating agent’s character traits and motives. The 
test is whether the agent’s participation is guided by virtues. To judge a claim 
against a system for leading to immoral actions requires examination of all the 
agents involved. If virtuous agents can sustain the system and remain virtuous in 
doing so, then the claim is invalid. 
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Following this approach, in this chapter I analyze two questions to 
evaluate a regulated organ market from the perspective of virtue ethics. In the first 
section, I ask if a virtuous agent would remain virtuous in a regulated organ 
market. Comparing a virtuous supplier’s and recipient’s attitude towards organ 
transplantation in a non-incentivized system to their attitude in an incentivized 
system, I argue that a virtuous agent would be reflecting as many if not more 
virtues by participating in a regulated organ market. In the second section, I go on 
to consider whether a virtuous agent would prefer one system to the other. I shall 
make a case that a virtuous person would prefer a regulated market system 
because in this system, the virtuous agent has more options, which enable her to 
exercise virtues and pursue human flourishing in ways she judges to be most 
appropriate. In sum, I will argue that virtue ethics does not provide a strong 
argument against a regulated organ market; in fact, it even sustains a case against 
the prohibition of an organ market. 
 
I.   Virtuous Participant 
 
In this section, I ask—and answer in the affirmative—whether virtuous 
agents would participate in both incentivized and non-incentivized organ 




discussion on the participation of the supplier and the recipient.145 If virtuous 
agents participate in a regulated organ market and remain virtuous in doing so, 
then the virtue ethics would claim that the act of selling or buying an organ is 
morally right given that it corresponds to what virtuous agents would do. By 
showing that virtuous agents would participate in an organ market, I argue that the 
commercial organ transaction can be performed virtuously. 
 
A. Non-Incentivized Systems 
 
It is probably uncontroversial that all participants can act virtuously in a 
non-incentivized system. Clearly, giving a life-saving organ typically reflects 
virtues like generosity, benevolence, compassion, charity, and courage.146 
Receiving an organ might at first glance appear neutral. But Aristotle’s 
understanding of human flourishing actually urges a stronger claim, namely, that 
a virtuous agent is most likely to accept an organ. According to Aristotle, human 
flourishing is an activity that requires “doing something” and not simply “being in 
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supporting the supplier’s and the recipient’s human flourishing. Virtuous third parties exercise 
compassion and kindness towards the recipient by helping to save the recipient’s life. They 
exercise benevolence by supporting virtuous suppliers’ and recipients’ exercise of virtues. 
Benevolence and compassion are among the virtues that some argue medical staff must prioritize. 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, “Professionalism, Profession and the Virtues of a Good Physician,” The 
Mount Sinai Journal of Medicine 69, no. 6 (2002): 381, argues that medical staff must prioritize 
certain fundamental virtues, namely, fidelity to trust, benevolence, intellectual honesty, courage, 
compassion, and truthfulness. 
146 It might be argued that the level of virtues that the supplier acts on varies with the amount of 
costs that the supplier is willing to bear without reimbursement. But this is not necessarily true. 
The supplier might lack financial means to afford the procedure without reimbursement. Or the 
supplier might use the reimbursed funds to show generosity to someone else who needs it more. In 
any event, the virtuous agent could always forfeit the reimbursement if she finds that this is the 




a certain state.”147 It is not sufficient to possess certain virtues as character traits 
to achieve human flourishing; one must also be able to realize these virtues by 
acting on them. Aristotle acknowledges the crucial importance of means like 
health, wealth, and social status necessary to pursue human flourishing.148 Hence 
a virtuous organ patient will generally accept a transplant to preserve the 
necessary means, namely, her health, to continue her pursuit of the supreme good, 
human flourishing. This would also reflect the serious-mindedness in the 
recipient’s attitude with respect to the achievement of human flourishing. 
 




Once the supplier receives an incentive, it is possible that the supplier no 
longer acts out of generosity, benevolence, compassion, charity, or courage, at 
least directly. Instead, the supplier might act only for the money. It does not 
follow, however, that such a supplier does not act virtuously. 
First, even a supplier who is directly motivated only by the money may 
use the money for an act of generosity, benevolence, compassion, and charity. For 
example, a virtuous supplier might sell her organ to a well-off recipient to obtain 
funds to help someone in financial need. Thereby, the virtuous supplier may direct 
her acts of benevolence and generosity in a balanced way and by prioritizing the 
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needs of the people she aims to help. In such cases, an organ market would 
provide the most suitable financial benefits among the incentivized systems given 
that money is easily transferable to those who are in need, unlike specific 
compensations such as tax reductions or health insurances. 
Second, and more importantly, a virtuous agent need not reject any 
personal gain, and can pursue personal gain and be benevolent, charitable, 
generous, and compassionate to others at the same time. As argued in the previous 
subsection, according to Aristotle, obtaining the worldly means—including 
financial means—to pursue human flourishing is not only legitimate but also 
necessary. Relatedly, other-regarding virtues, like any virtues, need not and 
cannot be followed at all times to the full extent at the exclusion of others. 
Aristotle’s understanding of virtue is based on the idea that the virtues are 
conditions between the states of excess and of deficiency.149 For example, being 
courageous is neither being cowardly nor being fearless; it is about understanding 
the dangers and the risks one can take given one’s position.150 Following this 
idea, an act of generosity, benevolence, charity, or compassion does not have to 
be an act that completely disregards the self. A virtuous agent can judge that these 
virtues lead her to make her organ available to a patient in need while also 
welcoming the personal benefits of this virtuous act. She does not have to be 
generous, benevolent, charitable, and compassionate to the point where she 
cannot accept any benefits for her act. At the same time, accepting the benefit 






does not imply that the virtuous agent is ignorant or insensitive towards the life 
and death situation of the recipient. 
Some virtue ethicists critical of organ markets do not deny that selling an 
organ could be guided by virtues, but claim that more likely than not the supplier 
will misjudge the benefits and harms or misbalance the virtues.151 This claim is 
highly problematic. While such misjudgment is possible, we have no more 
grounds to assume it for sales than for donations. Just as the sale of an organ may 
be affected by the supplier’s financial condition, the donation to a loved one is 
affected by the overwhelming emotional character of the situation, which may 
lead the donor to act out of fear of loss instead of courage and which may lead the 
donor to take unreasonable risks. Yet, in both circumstances, we should presume 
that a virtuous person validly judges the situation and balances the virtues. 
According to Aristotle, the capacity to be guided by reason makes humans differ 
from other species; living well means using reason well in order to live in 
accordance with virtues.152 If reason is the very essence of being human, and 
using reason is the key to living well, dismissing one’s actions as poorly reasoned 
requires a good justification especially since, as explained above, two virtuous 
agents may act differently under same circumstances. 
The virtuous agent’s willingness to accept benefits while performing a 
benevolent act is illustrated by our judgment of professionals who save lives, such 
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virtue ethics, Bjorkman and Gardiner make this case in their articles. Bjorkman in “Why We Are 
Not Allowed To Sell That Which We Are Encouraged To Donate” argues that the seller displays 
less courage than the donor, and Gardiner in “A Virtue Ethics Approach to Moral Dilemmas in 
Medicine” argues that the seller would be the desperate poor who takes a high risk for some 
immediate benefits. 




as fire fighters and doctors. Since these are paid jobs, anyone who chooses these 
jobs does not necessarily do so only out of benevolence and courage. At least part 
of the motivation may be financial. But of course nobody would argue that a 
virtuous person could not be a fire fighter or a doctor, or that the decision to take 
such a job is not the result of a valid exercise of reason. 
The existence of the incentives does not compel us to conclude that once 
there are incentives, the virtues vanish or are overwhelmed by irrational behavior. 
We can easily imagine a virtuous agent who chooses to be a fire fighter or doctor 
because of the virtues of saving lives and because of the benefits that allow her to 
attain the means for pursuing human flourishing. Similarly, a virtuous agent can 




The virtuous recipient’s main motivation in incentivized systems is the 
same virtuous motivation as in non-incentivized systems. As in the non-
incentivized system, the recipient mainly pursues the necessary means for human 
flourishing. 
The incentivized system also accommodates additional virtues, however, 
by allowing the virtuous recipient to provide benefits to the supplier. These 
benefits directly or indirectly reciprocate the supplier’s act of saving her life. 
Depending on the conditions of the supplier and the recipient, the recipient’s act 




charity for a person who is in financial need and who saved her life, or simply 
kindness and thankfulness towards her life saver. 
Reciprocity can also be an act of justice. In non-incentivized systems, the 
transaction remains unbalanced since the recipient only takes and the supplier 
only gives. Under certain circumstances (such as where the supplier is well off 
and the recipient is already financially challenged), this may be the only option. 
But if the recipient has the means, a virtuous recipient would find it unjust to take 
an organ from a supplier and not give anything in return, especially if the 
financial benefits will play an important role in the supplier’s life. 
It is not a valid objection that the recipient takes advantage of a desperate 
supplier who gives her organ only to receive crucial and otherwise unattainable 
benefits. As pointed out above, virtue ethics acknowledges the importance of 
obtaining worldly means necessary for human flourishing. Thus the recipient 
contributes to the supplier’s pursuit of her own human flourishing by participating 
in the transaction and bestowing a benefit upon the supplier. Crucially, as I have 
argued in discussing the supplier’s decision above, the virtuous recipient should 
presume that the transaction is beneficial to the supplier as long as the supplier 
makes an informed, rational, and voluntary decision. 
 
II.   Choosing a Virtuous System 
  
So far I looked at the incentivized and non-incentivized systems of organ 




virtuous in this system? None of the systems render an act of providing or 
receiving an organ necessarily vicious; in fact, many virtues would lead one to 
participate in these systems. Now, the second question is whether a virtuous 
person would prefer one of these systems to the other. This question will enable 
an assessment of a prohibition against an organ market within the framework of 
virtue ethics. If the virtuous agent were to find all the systems equally good, this 
would make a weak case against a prohibition, given that an organ market 
includes all other practices (such as donation), whereas other systems do not 
include an organ market. However, if the virtuous agent were to prefer an organ 
market, the case against a prohibition would become stronger. It would still not 
necessarily imply that a prohibition is morally wrong from the perspective of 
virtue ethics, given the theory’s indeterminate nature. But I claim that the 
prohibition would be morally unjustified if a virtuous agent were to prefer an 
organ market, as I shall indeed argue is the case. 
The virtuous agent can arguably make a comparison between incentivized 
and non-incentivized systems on three grounds: (1) Which one of these systems 
excludes more non-virtuous people from participating in them? (2) Which one 
allows more virtues to be eventually actualized? And (3) by choosing which 
system would a virtuous agent act virtuously? I will consider these questions 
separately, including whether they do indeed form a valid basis on which to 






A. Exclusion of Non-Virtuous Agents 
 
The first question that the virtuous agent may consider while comparing 
different systems is to ask which one excludes more non-virtuous agents. In the 
previous section, we established that a virtuous agent can remain virtuous in all 
systems. It does not follow that these systems will all exclude non-virtuous 
persons or, more to the point, that they will do so to the same degree. In 
particular, it might be argued that incentivized systems attract non-virtuous 
agents, whereas non-incentivized systems recruit only those who are virtuously 
motivated. A donor necessarily acts on the virtues of benevolence, compassion, 
and generosity, or so the argument would go, whereas a seller may act on selfish 
reasons that cannot even be justified in terms of procuring “means for pursuing 
human flourishing,” such as using the money to buy drugs. 
It is not clear, however, that this argument is empirically accurate—that is, 
whether most sellers do in fact act on vices when they sell their kidneys, whereas 
donors do not. To establish this fact would require empirical data. In the absence 
of such data, there is no obvious reason to assume this fact. To be sure, it is 
reasonable to assume that most donors act on virtues, even though some donors 
give their organs viciously in order to gain power within the family unit, to make 
the recipient feel in debt to her, or to manipulate others to think of her in a certain 
way. But it is unreasonable to assume that most sellers act viciously. The sellers 
who do not act only on other-regarding virtues are most likely to act on a mixed 




to survive financial hardships (hence, contributing to their pursuit of flourishing) 
or helping their loved ones to survive by using the money to provide for them 
(hence, again, acting virtuously). Even if the seller does not care about the 
recipient, her aim of helping herself and loved ones is still likely to be guided by 
virtues and not vices. 
Whatever the answer to this factual question, there is reason to doubt that 
a virtuous agent would even consider the answer in her decision which system to 
prefer. If one were to disallow practices merely because they can also attract 
vicious agents and behavior, many existing practices would need to be drastically 
restricted. In particular, remuneration would have to be eliminated from otherwise 
virtuous activities because it attracts some agents who act for vicious purposes. 
This would directly affect professions that help others and that would therefore be 
led by virtues of benevolence, compassion, kindness, and courage if remuneration 
were not provided. According to this reasoning, doctors, nurses, or fire fighters 
should not be paid. However, expecting such a behavior from these professionals 
would be forcing them to express excessive virtues and disregard their own 
human flourishing. Designing systems for heroes may exclude non-virtuous 
agents, but it will also exclude many virtuous agents and prevent them from 







B. Actualizing Virtues 
 
For the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, a more sensible 
approach to virtuous systems comparison may be the second question, namely, 
which system enables more virtues to be realized? There are two aspects to this 
question: (1) Which system allows each individual to express more virtues, and to 
express them more strongly? And (2) which one allows more people to act 
virtuously? This question avoids the problematic conclusion that the previous 
question leads to. At the same time, one may argue that it introduces 
maximization, which may seem out of character for virtue ethics. However, the 
concern here can also be formulated in terms of providing individuals with 
opportunities to develop their virtues and therefore to attain human flourishing. 
I will argue that the incentivized system seems preferable under both 
aspects. The incentivized system is more flexible and hence accommodates 
different balancing and prioritizing of virtues as well as allowing more variety of 
virtues to be realized. 
 
Virtues Expressed by Each Agent 
 
At a first and superficial glance, the non-incentivized systems might 
appear to foster ‘purer’ virtuous behavior. In a non-incentivized system, the 
supplier usually acts only out of kindness, courage, generosity, compassion, 




incentivized system, a supplier may also act out of selfishness. Yet this view is 
shortsighted and overlooks three powerful countervailing arguments. 
First, a virtuous agent who wants to emphasize only other-regarding 
virtues is free to do so in an incentivized system. Donations are not prohibited. 
Moreover, the virtuous agent can accept the reward but use it to support some 
third person who is more in need. In that way, the incentivized system expands 
the options where the virtues such as benevolence and charity can be 
appropriately realized. 
Second, a virtuous agent may very well act virtuously by using the reward 
for her own benefit. As I repeatedly emphasized, Aristotle’s conception of human 
flourishing demands rather than disparages worldly means that enable one to 
pursue one’s flourishing. By accepting the reward, the supplier may very well be 
pursuing her human flourishing, which is the ultimate goal that the virtues help 
one reach. This is another way in which the incentivized system expands the 
space for the expression of virtues. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, to consider only the supplier’s 
virtues and neglect the recipient’s leads to an incomplete evaluation of the system. 
The recipient’s expression of virtues is in an exact opposite of the supplier’s in 
both systems. In a non-incentivized system, the recipient simply expresses her 
appreciation and serious-mindedness towards life and her pursuit of flourishing. 
Her act of accepting the organ does not reflect any virtues in relation to the 
supplier. By contrast, in an incentivized system, the recipient can also act 




recipient’s act of providing benefits for the supplier or agreeing to accept the 
organ only if the supplier is provided with some benefits can reflect her 
appreciation, gratefulness, kindness, compassion, and justice towards the supplier. 
This suggests that if we look at both recipients and suppliers, the incentivized 
system realizes more virtues. 
 
Agents Acting Virtuously 
 
The incentivized system seems to have a clear advantage from the 
perspective of the number of virtuous agents participating in the system (or to be 
more precise, the number of agents being able to act on the virtues by 
participating in the system). The most important advantage of the incentivized 
systems, and especially of a market, is the ability to attract more suppliers and 
thereby to increase the number of supplied organs.153 This expands the number of 
virtuous agents in two ways. First, by saving more lives, the incentivized system 
gives more people the chance to continue their pursuit of human flourishing. 
Second, being a reciprocal system, it allows more means to be transferred to the 
supplier enabling her pursuit of human flourishing. 
A common objection in relation to the increased number of virtuous 
participants in the incentivized systems appeals to the crowding-out effect.154 This 
argument suggests that virtuous agents who would participate in donation might 
not participate in a market because they consider the act of providing an organ in 
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a market polluted by the incentives. Again, there are two immediate problems 
with the crowding-out argument: In a market, a supplier remains free to make a 
voluntary donation (by refusing compensation) or to use the money for charity. 
But more importantly, from the perspective of virtue ethics, it is questionable 
whether a person who gives her organ only if her act is considered to be 
‘altruistic’ genuinely acts on virtues of benevolence and compassion, rather than 
desiring to create a certain ‘virtuous’ image for herself. Given that the nature and 
the most important consequence of the act—namely, saving another person’s 
life—does not change between incentivized and non-incentivized systems, a 
genuinely virtuous agent should not be affected by the perception of her act. 
 
C. Virtuous Choice 
 
The last question that the virtuous agent may ponder is, which system 
would it be virtuous to choose? That is to say, rather than considering 
participants’ virtuous or vicious behavior, the agent might ask herself what virtues 
she herself expresses by choosing one system over the other. This amounts to 
considering the system in itself, but through the virtues of the agent making the 
choice. Thus, the virtuous agent would ask, by choosing which system do I 
promote justice, show compassion and benevolence to those who are in need, and 
so on? In this perspective, the organ market’s capacity to generate more organs 
and hence to help more patients would appear to strongly favor the organ market. 




Whether or not they have the financial means, these people are racing against time 
while enduring pain and anxiety. By being most likely to save the most number of 
lives, the incentivized systems, and especially an organ market, facilitate their 
survival. In addition, the organ market also provides suppliers with necessary 
means to further their human flourishing, rather than just demanding a unilateral 
sacrifice as the non-incentivized system does. Hence the virtuous agent would 
appear to show most benevolence and compassion by choosing the organ market. 
This presupposes, of course, that the market is regulated such that all 
participation is rational, informed, and voluntary, and manipulation is not an 
issue. Otherwise, a virtuous agent would have to be concerned about possible 
exploitation of the desperately poor in an incentivized system. If suppliers are 
well informed, however, the fate of even desperately poor suppliers actually 
argues in favor of the organ market, as it provides these suppliers with desperately 
needed means to further their human flourishing. As I argued in Chapter 2, selling 
a kidney is in fact a relatively low risk way to make money for the poor, even 
compared to such professions as fishing or logging in developed countries, and 
taking this option away would burden the poor even further. The small size of the 
risk for suppliers in proper care also implies that the patients requiring a 
transplant are certainly those who are most in need of benevolence and 
compassion. Also, when it comes to justice, incentivized systems can be argued to 
reduce irrelevant discrimination in determining which patients will survive. In a 
non-incentivized system, one can claim that there is injustice towards those 




imprisons them in a web of social relations where one’s chances for survival 
increases drastically with the size of her family, the closeness of the family 
members, and the friendships that she has. On the other hand, an organ market 
gives a chance for those who cannot get an organ through donation without 




In the first section, I showed that selling and buying organs can be done by 
the virtuous agents; and by participating in an incentivized system, the virtuous 
agents would still be acting virtuously. In the second section, I postulated three 
questions that the virtuous agent may ask in order to choose one system of organ 
transplantation over the others. The first question proves to be a controversial 
ground for comparison. The second and the third questions favor incentivized 
systems. Hence we can conclude that a virtuous agent would prefer a regulated 
organ market over other systems. A prohibition would conflict with this 
preference. Therefore, a prohibition of a regulated organ market would be morally 














As in other areas of bioethics, many arguments about the organ market are 
explicitly or implicitly based on principlism, four basic principles set forth in 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics written by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. 
Childress and first published in 1979.155 According to Beauchamp and Childress, 
four basic principles “function as general guidelines for the formulation of the 
more specific rules;” these are principles of respect for autonomy, 
nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice.156  In topics such as euthanasia or 
extreme measures for prolonging life, these principles serve as a basic checklist to 
determine the fundamental issues in the discussion of which action would be the 
morally right. Unlike utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, principlism does not 
possess a meta-criterion and does not explain how the four principles should be 
balanced.  
Principlism’s appeal is its simplicity. It employs only four intuitive 
principles instead of a complicated comprehensive ethical theory. This makes 
principlism seem easy to apply especially for medical practitioners in many of the 
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everyday problems that they encounter. For example, the four principles direct a 
surgeon to ensure that the patient makes an informed, voluntary, and rational 
decision (respect for autonomy), that the chosen procedure is expected to cause 
less harm and more benefit to the patient (nonmaleficence and beneficence), and 
that the patient is receiving the treatment that other patients under equal 
circumstances receive (justice).157 The downside of principlism’s simplicity is 
that it appears ill-equipped to address trade-offs between different principles, and 
between the same principle applied to different people. Such trade-offs inevitably 
arise in more complex situations such as organ transplantation that involves 
multiple parties. 
In particular, the principle of nonmaleficence is in tension with any type of 
organ transplantation from the living. From the perspective of the supplier, the 
procedure is completely unnecessary while creating risk and discomfort. ‘Do no 
harm’ would seem not to allow this. In the first section, I argue that the principles 
of nonmaleficence and beneficence can be interpreted in a way that defuses this 
tension and justifies organ transplantation. Once this is done, however, a coherent 
application also justifies an organ market. Hence, I conclude that a regulated 
organ market does not violate the requirements of principlism. 
In the second section, I evaluate the prohibition of a regulated organ 
market. This evaluation shows that such a prohibition in fact violates all four 
principles of the framework. Therefore, such a prohibition is morally wrong with 
respect to principlism. 
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I. Evaluation of Individuals’ Actions 
 
A.     Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
 
The principle of respect for autonomy is founded on the patients’ “right to 
hold views, to make choices, and to take actions based on their personal values 
and beliefs.”158 It requires “acknowledging the value and decision-making rights 
of persons and enabling them to act autonomously.”159 Beauchamp and Childress 
understand autonomous action “in terms of normal choosers who act (1) 
intentionally, (2) with understanding, and (3) without controlling influences that 
determine their action.”160  
In a non-incentivized system, an example of a violation of the principle 
would be a family member, who is under great pressure to give her organ since 
she is the only match in the family and the only hope for the recipient’s survival, 
even though her voluntary decision is against providing her organ. However, the 
structure of the transplantation systems ensures the informed, voluntary, and 
rational decision of the participants. Regulations such as informed consent aim to 
eliminate involuntary, coerced, or manipulated individuals and allow only those 
who autonomously agree to the transplantation to participate. Therefore, in non-
incentivized systems, this principle is not violated. 
The incentivized systems raise concerns about the supplier’s autonomy, 
bringing out the arguments on irrefutable offers to vulnerable groups that we have 
                                                 
158 Ibid., 103. 
159 Ibid. 




already considered in Chapter 2. Once the system allows incentives, the argument 
goes, this enables those who are not motivated by the idea of saving another’s life 
to be a part of the system. Individuals who seek material benefits agree to make 
their organ available in order to acquire these benefits, and it is argued that the 
desperate people end up participating in the system non-autonomously.  
Beauchamp and Childress emphasize the non-ideal understanding of 
autonomy in order to avoid an extremely demanding principle. They claim that an 
adequate theory of autonomy “coheres with the moral requirement that we respect 
the ways in which we govern our lives, such as the ways we take care of our 
health and take care of our children, as well as our everyday choices, such as 
opening bank accounts, purchasing goods in stores, and authorizing repair of an 
automobile.”161 This understanding of autonomy excludes those who are 
“immature, incapacitated, ignorant, coerced, or exploited” such as “[i]nfants, 
irrationally suicidal individuals, and drug-dependent patients.”162 By not using the 
idealized understanding of autonomy where one is considered autonomous only 
when one is free from all influences, Beauchamp and Childress also allow 
individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds and vulnerable populations to have 
the chance to act autonomously.163 Thereby, the theory does not differentiate 
between the incentivized and non-incentivized systems in terms of autonomy as 
long as both systems have regulations in place that ensure informed, rational, and 
voluntary participation. 
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B.     Principles of Nonmaleficence and Beneficence 
 
The principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence complement each other 
in evaluating the procedure in relation to the individual’s well-being. Any 
evaluation of a procedure only in relation to one of these principles leaves the 
discussion incomplete. Therefore, while they bring out different aspects of the 
procedure, in the evaluation of organ transplantation systems, I apply them 
together. 
 
Do No Harm  
 
The second principle—namely, the principle of nonmaleficence, also 
named the do no harm principle—refers to the obligation of not inflicting harm 
on others.164 This principle is usually brought up in relation to the health care 
professionals to emphasize their obligation to refrain from performing any 
procedure that harms the patient. This requirement applies not only for the acts 
committed but also for the ones omitted. In other words, while there is an 
obligation to make sure that the treatment does not inflict any intentional or 
unnecessary harm to the patient, it is also necessary to ensure that there is no harm 
caused by the refusal of treatment.  
Even though this principle seems to capture a core value in medical 
decision making, it does not work smoothly when it is applied to the organ 
transplantation from the living. While the procedure of organ transplantation does 
                                                 




not conflict with the principle of nonmaleficence when we consider the recipient’s 
position, the problem occurs when we turn to the supplier. By undergoing a 
transplant procedure, the recipient is not harmed; on the contrary, the procedure 
saves her life. However, the procedure to remove the organ necessarily causes 
harm to the supplier given the anxiety and pain related to the surgery and 
discomfort during recovery. As a healthy person, the supplier does not have any 
medical reason for going through a surgery that has some risks and that results in 
a permanent alteration of her body. In this case, the doctor intentionally causes 
unnecessary harm to the patient by allowing her to go through a major surgery 
and removing the organ. There is no medical reason that justifies the harm that is 
inflicted upon the supplier. From the physical perspective, the supplier endures 
harm for a purpose that does not benefit her. The doctor’s duty of do no harm 
requires her to refrain from performing this medically futile procedure on her 
patient. Therefore, if we simply look at the physical harm and benefit to the 
supplier, the procedure of removing her organ cannot be justified. 
Beauchamp and Childress argue that the principle of nonmaleficence is 
not an absolute rule.165 It does not have any priority over the other principles. 
Instead, it must be balanced with respect to the other principles, and especially to 
the principle of beneficence given their close relationship.166  
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The principle of beneficence entails “obligations to confer benefits, to 
prevent and remove harms, and to weigh an action’s possible goods against its 
costs and possible harms”; yet this does not imply following a utilitarian model 
where “society’s interests to override individual interests and rights” is 
justified.167 Whereas the principle of nonmaleficence is a negative rule that 
restricts the actions in a manner that prevents harm to the patient, the principle of 
beneficence is a positive rule that requires the actions to benefit the patient. 
Applied to the health care professionals, the doctors’ duty does not end in 
ensuring that the patients are not harmed, but they actively need to work for 
improving the patients’ medical conditions.  
In the case of organ transplantation, the procedure certainly benefits the 
recipient by saving her life. Yet, it does not contribute to the supplier’s physical 
well-being in any way. From the doctor’s perspective, the principle of 
beneficence entails that it is her duty to explore the possible means to provide the 
necessary organ transplant for the patient. However, the doctor’s duty changes 
when we consider the supplier’s position. The principle of beneficence does not 
seem to justify the doctor’s actions towards the supplier since medically the 
supplier does not need any improvement in her condition. In this sense, the 
doctor’s duty is simply to refrain from interfering with the already healthy 
supplier since she cannot benefit from the doctor’s services. 
                                                 




Given the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence, it appears as 
though organ transplantation cannot be justified. Not only the procedure 
physically harms the supplier, but also this harm cannot be justified in terms of 
the physical benefits that she will receive. However, as stated before, according to 
the principlism, none of these principles are absolute, and a balance between the 




The understanding of balancing harm and benefits leads to the justification 
of minor injuries to the patient for the major benefits of life-saving 
interventions.168 Hence, a procedure like surgery is justified since the doctor 
should not refrain from harming the patient by cutting her if the surgery is going 
to benefit her by saving her life. This balance between the harm to the patient and 
benefit to the patient does not apply directly to the organ transplantation cases 
where the harm falls on one patient and the benefit on another. There are two 
ways of justifying the harm that the supplier bears in relation to the principles of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence.  
 
Interpersonal Harm–Benefit Balance 
 
The first option is to turn to a utilitarian method. The harm that is inflicted 
on the supplier is justified by the benefits that the recipient experiences. Due to 
                                                 




the surgery, the supplier experiences short-term pain and discomfort but leads a 
healthy life afterwards. On the other hand, the recipient avoids pain and suffering 
of continuous medical treatment and regains a chance for a healthy life instead of 
waiting for a certain death. Clearly, the benefits to the recipient outweigh the 
harm to the supplier. This justification is a utilitarian calculation that favors organ 
transplantation by taking into account the overall harm and benefits. 
One may argue, given that there are other principles such as respect for 
autonomy, that principlism does not collapse into a complete utilitarian 
framework. However, Beauchamp and Childress endorse that the principles are 
not absolute rules. Any principle is “[a] prima facie obligation that must be 
fulfilled unless it conflicts, on a particular occasion, with an equal or stronger 
obligation.”169 Hence, the principles are binding as long as another principle—“a 
competing moral obligation”—does not outweigh them.170 In other words, respect 
for autonomy is an obligation, yet if the principles of nonmaleficence and 
beneficence conflict with it, then it may be overridden. In which case, if the 
principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence are taken to include interpersonal 
justifications, then although principlism is not equal to the utilitarianism, it may 
collapse into a utilitarian framework under certain circumstances.  
Even though this interpretation of striking a balance between the 
principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence justifies organ transplantation, 
Beauchamp and Childress explicitly disagree with a complete utilitarian 
                                                 





approach.171 This suggests that this interpretation is not coherent with the 
framework that they offer. Yet, they also do not provide any limitations on how to 
balance the principles and stop them from collapsing into a utilitarian framework 
or from being arbitrarily neglected for the sake of other principles.  
 
Individual Harm–Benefit Balance 
 
One way to distinguish principlism from utilitarianism is by insisting on 
focusing on individuals and respecting all the principles at the highest possible 
degree. This understanding of principlism leads to a different interpretation of the 
principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence, and their application to the organ 
transplantation. Focusing on the individual, it is argued that the harm–benefit 
balance must be attained by considering only the individual; however, this does 
not lead to an immediate objection against organ transplantation. Instead, it is 
argued that the concepts of harm and benefit need not be limited to the physical 
aspects of the procedure.  
 
Physical and Psychological Harm and Benefit 
 
If the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence are limited to the 
physical harm and benefit to the individuals, then many medical procedures 
become objectionable in relation to these principles. Many medical procedures 
involve harming the patient in a way that is not always justified by physical 
                                                 




benefits. A common example of this is the cosmetic and reconstructive surgeries 
that do not involve lifesaving, life-prolonging or health-improving benefits. It is 
accepted as a common procedure that when an individual agrees to endure the 
pain and discomfort of the surgical procedure for breast enlargement or 
reconstruction of her breasts after mastectomy, the harm is not justified in terms 
of improving her medical condition but by the psychological or social benefits 
that the patient desires. As long as the patient is considered competent to make 
this decision and the risk is not judged to be too high for this specific surgery on 
this specific patient, the surgery is carried. This shows that conventionally, we do 
not dismiss every medical procedure that involves harm and that is not performed 
with the aim of improving the patient’s medical conditions.  
The example of cosmetic surgeries suggests that the organ transplantation 
can also be justified on the same grounds. However, a careful analysis reveals that 
an analogy between cosmetic surgery and organ transplantation does not hold. In 
fact, this discrepancy serves well for showing that the justification of organ 
transplantation is quite controversial when applied to other procedures such as 
cosmetic surgeries. 
It can be argued that similar to the cosmetic surgery cases, justification of 
organ transplantation relies on the non-medical factors such as psychological 
benefits. An argument defending the non-incentivized transplantation claims that 
the principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence include the “psychological and 
moral” effects as well as the physical ones.172 It is argued that even though the 
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supplier will endure physical harm with no aim of physical benefits by giving her 
organ, refusing her to serve as a supplier may cause “psychological and moral 
harms” on the individual. In a non-incentivized system, where the supplier acts on 
a desire to save her loved one’s life, not being able to do so will cause 
considerable psychological harm on the individual. By giving an organ, the 
supplier not only avoids the harm that will result from the helplessness in the face 
of watching a loved one die, but the studies show that she will also experience 
psychological benefits such as increased self-esteem after participating in organ 
transplantation.173  
This argument does not rely on the familiar—yet, still controversial—
justification of cosmetic surgeries; it relies on a more problematic position. While 
the procedure of cosmetic surgery results with a preferred state of one’s body, 
organ transplantation results with a permanent removal of a functioning and 
healthy body part for reasons that do not contribute to one’s preferences of one’s 
body. In the organ transplantation cases, the justification does not have anything 
to do with the individual’s own state but it is constructed by appealing to her 
relationships such as her connection to the ill family member. While the 
immediate benefit of the cosmetic surgery falls upon the patient, the immediate 
benefit of organ transplantation falls upon a third party. In other words, whereas 
the cosmetic surgery can be justified by the claim that it benefits the individual, 
organ transplantation cannot be justified by the same argument but it has to appeal 





to the benefit that the individual will receive by securing this particular 
relationship.174 
Problems with this justification are revealed better when we apply the 
same reasoning to the cosmetic surgeries. This reasoning can be found in a case 
where the individual does not have any problems and dissatisfaction about her 
breast size but is going through the surgery in order to comply with the 
preferences of her partner. In this case, just like in organ transplantation, there is 
no direct benefit to the patient but an indirect benefit by securing her relationship 
and avoiding the psychological harm of losing a loved one.175 Such a reason for 
cosmetic surgery is precisely the one that is widely perceived as the “wrong 
reason.”176 
In response to this position, an argument can be formulated by appealing 
to the nature and value of these relationships. However, the main claim of 
employing the example of cosmetic surgeries persists; the physical harm and risks 
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of organ transplantation can only be justified by appealing to a wider and more 
controversial understanding of psychological harm and benefit. 
Assuming we agree with this understanding of the psychological effects in 
individualistic harm–benefit balance, such a justification would hold more 
strongly in non-incentivized systems where the majority of suppliers are 
emotionally involved with the recipient. It can be argued that the commercial 
suppliers, being not motivated enough to give their organs for free, would not 
derive substantial psychological benefit from the act to justify the physical harm. 
  
Financial Harm and Benefit as a Factor in Well-Being 
 
If the psychological benefits are not as strongly present in the incentivized 
systems of organ transplantation as in the non-incentivized systems, does it entail 
that the incentivized systems violate the principles of nonmaleficence and 
beneficence? In non-incentivized systems, since the motivation of the supplier is 
only emotional, it can be argued that her decision to give her organ reflects her 
judgment of psychological benefits outweighing the physical harms. However, 
once the financial benefits are introduced, the balance between the physical and 
psychological harm becomes unclear. Therefore, the argument concludes that 
whereas a doctor in a non-incentivized system can be justified in acting on the 
supplier’s decision and removing a kidney from her for the purposes of 




Such an argument has two problems: (1) It overestimates the enthusiasm 
in non-incentivized suppliers and (2) it underestimates the role that financial 
means may play on one’s overall physical and psychological well-being. I argue 
that given the motivations of participants and the effects of financial benefits on 
the supplier’s well-being, this distinction between non-incentivized and 
incentivized systems vanishes. 
The argument relies on the assumption that most suppliers in the non-
incentivized system are directed suppliers who receive psychological benefits by 
avoiding the pain of helplessly watching a loved one die, whereas most suppliers 
in the incentivized system are non-directed suppliers who would not be 
psychologically harmed if they could not make their organ available. This 
argument may hold as long as this distinction is valid; however, this is not 
obvious. While the supplier in the non-incentivized system may judge the act of 
giving her organ to be the best available option when all things considered, this 
does not entail that each supplier is actually enthusiastic about this option and 
would suffer if they cannot complete their act. It may well be the case that in 
many—and even maybe in most—cases, the supplier acts on a duty that she may 
be happy to shake off if the option of donation were never available to her. It is 
reasonable to assume that a typical supplier in a non-incentivized system is 
motivated not by psychological benefits but by moral or social obligations that 
arise only with the existence of the option.  
On the other hand, it is also possible that many—if not most—suppliers in 




helping their loved ones. The suppliers in incentivized systems may act out of 
their desire to acquire the necessary means for a life saving treatment that a family 
member needs or for helping their families to get rid of debt. In such cases, the 
psychological harm of watching a loved one die is avoided in an indirect way by 
the financial means that the supplier acquires through selling her organ. 
Considering such cases, it is not obvious whether the argument relies on a real 
distinction. 
This also points to the second problem with this argument, which is that it 
underestimates the indirect but crucial role that the financial means play in one’s 
physical and psychological well-being. As mentioned above, the supplier in an 
incentivized system may be motivated by life-and-death matters in her decision to 
sell her organ. Yet, even if the situation is not as crucial, the supplier may simply 
find the psychological benefits of a better education or the physical benefits of a 
comprehensive medical insurance that she can afford in return for selling her 
organ to outweigh the harm the procedure causes. In the end, given that the risk of 
kidney removal under adequate care is negligible, as the WHO states, there does 
not need to be extreme benefits in order to justify the harm.177 
The individualistic approach of harm–benefit balance justifies organ 
transplantation only if the scope of harm and benefit is widened to include 
psychological effects of the procedure in addition to the physical ones.178 It is not 
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simple to judge which non-physical benefits—that is, psychological, financial, or 
social benefits—outweigh the physical harms and risks of a procedure. Since one 
cannot refer to an objective measure in such comparisons, the judgment 
necessarily depends on the supplier’s decision. As long as the supplier is provided 
with all the relevant information and is considered to be competent to make a 
rational and voluntary decision, no outsider, including the health care 
professional, is qualified to override her decision. Therefore, according to the 
individualistic interpretation of the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence, 
once the organ donation is justified, so is the organ sale.  
 
C.     Principle of Justice 
 
The last principle that Beauchamp and Childress put forward is the 
principle of justice. This principle differs from the others in focusing on the 
society as opposed to individuals. The main demand of the principle of justice is 
that “[e]quals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated 
unequally.”179 As Beauchamp and Childress point out, this is a very broad claim, 
and without identifying in which respect the equality is determined, the principle 
lacks substance. However, Beauchamp and Childress do not provide any 
particular account of justice; they simply refer to the various existing theories 
suggesting that every theory presents a “valuable perspective” while remaining 
incomplete and insufficient.180  
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In relation to the organ transplantation, the principle can be applied both to 
the procedure of procuring the organs and of allocating the organs within the 
systems of organ transplantation. One of the main concerns of the principle of 
justice is the distribution of burdens and benefits within the society. A move from 
a non-incentivized system to an incentivized system is often objected in relation 
to the distribution of burdens and benefits in the society. The wide spread 
objection against an organ market refers to the vulnerable groups. It is argued that 
whereas the non-incentivized systems do not take advantage of certain groups in 
the population, the incentive based systems target the vulnerable groups by 
providing attractive benefits for the desperately poor.  
I have already dealt with this objection in relation to the principle of 
respect for autonomy. From the perspective of the principle of justice, Beauchamp 
and Childress take up this objection in relation to the research subjects and claim 
that “[n]othing about economically disadvantaged persons justifies their 
exclusion, as a group, from participation in research, just as it does not follow 
from their status as disadvantaged that they should be excluded from participating 
in any legal activity.”181 According to Beauchamp and Childress, “The presence 
of an irresistibly attractive offer is a necessary condition of ‘undue inducement,’ 
but this condition is not by itself sufficient to make an inducement undue. A 
situation of undue inducement must also involve a person’s assumption of a 
sufficiently serious risk of harm that he or she would not ordinarily assume.”182  
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Following this explanation, it is clear that the commercial kidney 
transplantation is not likely to give rise to “undue inducement” arguments. 
Beauchamp and Childress claim that “[i]nducements are not undue unless they are 
both above the level of standard risk (hence ‘excessive’ risk) and irresistibly 
attractive (hence ‘excessive’ in payment) in light of a constraining situation” 
where the level of excessive risk should be above “the level of common job risks 
such as those of unskilled construction work.”183 Kidney transplantation neither 
involves high levels of risk nor necessarily gives rise to excessive payment in a 
regulated market system.184  
 
II. Evaluation of a Prohibition 
 
As I showed in the first section, a prohibition against a regulated organ 
market cannot be based on a claim that the practice conflicts with the principles. 
Here, I take another step and claim that, in fact, the prohibition itself conflicts 
with the four principles. A prohibition against a regulated organ market prevents 
the eligible suppliers and recipients to engage in a commercial transaction. By 
doing so, the prohibition neglects their autonomy, enforces an ungrounded harm–
benefit balance, and possibly creates an unjust system. Consequently, according 
to principlism, prohibiting an organ market is morally wrong. 
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A. Violation of the Principle of Respect for Autonomy 
 
Stopping the informed, rational, and voluntary supplier and recipient from 
participating in the commercial transaction violates the principle of respect for 
autonomy. In a regulated market, the autonomous decision of every participant is 
ensured (as I showed in the first section, the counter-argument from supplier 
vulnerability is unfounded). Hence respect for autonomy entails respect for the 
participant’s decision to sell her organ.185 None of this to say, of course, that 
principlism favors the sale of an organ over a donation. But respect for autonomy 
demands that autonomous individuals to be allowed to make this choice 
themselves. The organ market accomplishes this because it includes in itself all 
other systems.  
 
B. Violation of the Principles of Beneficence and Nonmaleficence 
 
The prohibition also violates the principles of beneficence and 
nonmaleficence both towards the suppliers and the recipients. This is obvious 
with respect to the recipient who is left to die, or at least to spend painful time on 
the waiting list and on dialysis, because she is not allowed to purchase an organ. 
But it is also true with respect to the supplier, if one follows the understanding of 
the principles laid out in the preceding section. As I argued there, if non-
incentivized transplantation is justified in terms of non-physical benefits, then a 
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coherent application of the principle of beneficence also demands the supplier to 
be justified to sell her organ. In terms of non-physical harm and benefit, not 
allowing the supplier sell her organ goes against the principle of beneficence.  
 
C. Violation of the Principle of Justice 
 
Finally, prohibiting the recipient and the supplier to participate in the 
commercial transaction can violate the principle of justice: it makes the survival 
of the patient dependent on her social connectedness, burdens family members to 
donate their organs out of desperation, robs the poor of an option of earning 
money, and, most importantly, causes a scarcity of organs and hence a major 
inequality between the many that the scarcity condemns to die and those lucky 
enough to receive an organ. 
Oftentimes, one encounters the inverse argument, namely that a market for 
organs would create injustice because it supposedly ‘forces’ poor people to sell 
their organs. This argument, as I discussed in the first section, relies on a 
necessary condition of coercion, manipulation, or incompetence that results from 
being poor. However, this necessary condition of the argument is not a necessary 
condition of the system. A more direct concern that is rarely addressed is that a 
prohibition necessarily robs the poor from an acceptable option (in terms of its 
low risks and its valuable goal) of making money. By doing so, the prohibition 




What is generally overlooked is the massive inequality entailed by the 
scarcity that a prohibition creates. The Iranian experience shows that kidneys do 
not necessarily fall under the category of ‘scarce goods’. After legalizing 
commercial kidney transplantation in 1988, Iran eliminated the waiting list by the 
end of 1999.186 Thus, a prohibition creates crucial allocation problems, where any 
allocation will lead thousands of people to death, and any decision between 
different allocations is essentially arbitrary. In the current donation system, life or 
death hinge on the seconds of entering the waiting list, or points acquired by 
relatives who are willing to donate their organs after death.187 By contrast, a 
regulated organ market may reduce drastically the number of patients who do not 
receive an organ and maybe even eliminate it. 
In a non-incentivized system where organs are scarce, directed donation is 
the best option with the least amount of waiting time (hence, the least amount of 
health deterioration and best health outcome after transplantation). This privileges 
patients with large families or a large group of social relationships. Less fortunate 
patients, like immigrants, orphans, or widows, have drastically fewer chances of 
finding a donor and hence for survival. In societies where women are 
disadvantaged within the society, women are most likely to be the donors and 
least likely to receive donations.188 To create more equal chances for survival 
requires a mechanism that provides organs for those who become disadvantaged 
in the system of donation. An incentivized system might provide more ‘just’ 
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conditions for these disadvantaged patients. To be sure, the incentivized system 
might disadvantage other groups, in particular those with little money who cannot 
afford to purchase an organ. This is not a problem of organ allocation, however, 
but rather one of health care allocation. Moreover, as a practical matter, the actual 
effect on poor patients is likely to be the exact opposite, i.e., an organ market 
would help those with limited access to health care. As I explained in Chapter 2, 
the expected price of a kidney is an order of magnitude lower than the price of 
even just one year of dialysis. Consequently, replacing the current system of 
donation with an organ market would make the system more inclusive for the 
poor, rather than less. 
The lack of a commercial option also burdens family members by trapping 
them in a situation where the only option of saving their relative’s life is to give 
their own kidneys. This obligation puts unjustified pressure on those who are 
scared of donating their organs. Moreover, as mentioned, in societies where 
certain family members are in a more vulnerable position, the system forces them 





































 In Part II, I have evaluated the moral permissibility of a regulated organ 
market by focusing on the actions that it entails. I argued that the claim that an 
organ market necessarily entails immoral actions is unfounded in all four ethical 
theories that I have considered. I showed not only that the necessary actions in a 
regulated organ market are morally permissible but also that a typical transaction 
does not violate any moral principles. 
 I also analyzed the prohibition of a regulated organ market from the 
perspectives of four ethical theories. I concluded that a prohibition is morally 
unjustified in all four ethical frameworks and even strongly argued to be morally 
wrong in utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, and principlism. 
 In this last part, I turn to some of the practical aspects of the issue and use 
the analysis that I provided in Part II to evaluate some practical questions. First, I 
argue for the necessity of the condition in any system of organ transplantation that 
I have posed in Part I and assumed in Part II: fully informed, rational, and 
voluntary participation. In the second section, I take a look at three regulations: 
common database for organ matching, insurance coverage for purchase of organs, 
and insurance for the supplier for transplantation related complications. I argue 
for these regulations pointing out to the ethical theories that support them, even 
though none of them are supported by all four ethical theories. And finally, in the 
third section, I evaluate the existing guidelines on organ transplantation and sale 
of organs. I argue that these guidelines fail in two respects: (1) They do not 




(2) their claims are not supported by any of the ethical theories that I have 




























REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
 
 In Chapter 2, I presented definitions of the systems of organ 
transplantation and limited the discussion in Part II to a particular set of systems. 
All of these systems shared a basic requirement: allowing only fully informed, 
rational, and voluntary individuals to participate in organ transplantation. This 
restriction aimed to keep the focus on the main distinction between the systems—
namely, the role of incentives and monetary transaction. In this chapter, I first go 
back to this limitation (which I will call the requirement of informed consent) that 
I have put forward in the beginning and argue for its necessity.189 I claim that the 
basic requirement for informed consent of the participants is morally grounded, 
and forgoing it would characterize any system as morally impermissible whether 
or not it involves incentives. In the second section, I present and evaluate a 
number of regulations for an ethical organ market. Finally, I conclude the chapter 
by looking at the existing international guidelines in relation to organ market and 
argue not only that the guidelines are wrongly directed at a regulated organ 
market but that their claims are wrong. 
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I. Moral Necessity of Regulations in Organ Market 
 
A market on organs differs from markets for many other ‘goods,’ such as 
consumer products like cars and clothes, and services like hair-dressers and 
restaurants. The ground of this argument is laid down by Kenneth Arrow in 
“Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care.”190 Arrow points out 
five distinguishing factors of medical care in comparison to “usual commodity”: 
the nature of demand, expected behavior of the physician, product uncertainty, 
supply conditions, and pricing practices. These distinguishing factors by and large 
also apply to the organ market. 
In this section, I first present the differences between an organ market and 
a market for common goods. Then, I justify the necessity of the basic 
requirement, showing that for an organ transplantation to be morally permissible, 
all four ethical frameworks demand the participants to act on a fully informed, 
rational, and voluntary decision.  
 
A. The Special Character of an Organ Market 
 
The organ market involves two main parties: the supplier who provides 
the organ and the recipient who provides the money. However, unlike a 
transaction of usual commodities such as a car, the transaction of an organ occurs 
only once for the supplier and maybe even for the recipient, and it involves 
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further risks, which the parties are typically unaware of. In an organ market, the 
recipient has an urgent demand on which her life depends. She does not have the 
time to ‘shop around’ and in most cases, as the transaction is delayed, she also 
does not have a calm attitude towards the transaction. Even though, in comparison 
to the supplier, the recipient, through her interaction with the health care staff, has 
a considerably greater understanding of the situation, of the available options, and 
of what these options involve, she still typically lacks the understanding and 
knowledge that the health care professionals possess. 
The supplier, who enters the market with a desire to help or a desire to 
earn money, is in the beginning likely to be completely uninformed, misinformed, 
or at best partially informed about what this transaction involves. On the other 
hand, she has only one chance to participate in this market, whereas the recipient 
can technically buy an organ more than once if the previous purchase fails 
prematurely or simply ‘wears off’ with time. However, the recipient’s ability to 
participate in organ market depends on the consequences of the first transaction 
since a failed transplant may cause deterioration in her health, which may render 
her ineligible for further transplants. 
These issues, which are necessarily a part of an organ market, do not 
constitute a crucial problem in a market for cars, for example. The buyers in a car 
market can acquire a good deal of information without buying the product. They 
can do test-drives, ask others who use the exact same car for the same purposes, 
and compare with other cars that they tested or bought before. If they are still 




a new one and repeat this as long as they can afford it. The need for a car is never 
as urgent as the need for an organ, and the effects of delayed purchase do not 
cause great stress to the potential buyer in comparison to a patient in the organ 
waiting list. 
Given these crucial differences, it can be reasonably argued that a market 
for organs can be evaluated in its own terms distinct from a market for usual 
commodities. Such a market may require regulations that a market for usual 
commodities does not require. In light of this, throughout Part II, the systems of 
organ transplantation are discussed within the limitations of a basic requirement 
integrated into their definitions. The basic requirement is that every participant of 
organ transplantation has to be fully informed, rational, and voluntary. This 
necessary condition applies to both incentivized and non-incentivized systems. 
Even though the crucial role of this requirement presents itself most strongly 
when the supplier’s decision is concerned, it is also important for the recipient’s 
decision to undergo the procedure.  
 
B. Moral Evaluation of the Basic Requirement  
 
Any organ transplantation, whether or not it involves incentives, has to 
ensure the informed consent of the participants. By each ethical framework—
namely, utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and principlism—this 
requirement is supported, and in the absence of this basic requirement for 




justified. To show this, let us examine the requirement for informed consent in 




In the utilitarian framework, informed consent does not have a value by 
itself. Yet, it may and typically does have a derivative value from its contribution 
to the maximization of overall happiness or preference satisfaction. This 
connection is particularly close in preference utilitarianism, which takes as the 
ultimate yardstick what the individual chooses with full information, rationally, 
and voluntarily–that is, exactly what informed consent is designed to guarantee.191 
Classical utilitarianism does not give such exalted status to individual choices. 
But assuming that individuals generally aim to maximize their own happiness, 
achieving maximum overall happiness is unlikely if individuals make predictions 
of happiness irrationally, or based on misinformation.  
The immediate consequences of the organ transplantation fall on the 
supplier and the recipient. For acting morally in the utilitarian framework—that 
is, to maximize the preference satisfaction and overall happiness for both 
parties—the individual supplier and recipient need to determine their own 
informed, rational, and voluntary preferences, as well as having a reason to 
believe that the other party is also acting with informed consent. Similarly, in 
order to determine if a policy would maximize preference satisfaction, informed, 
                                                 




rational, and voluntary preferences of all parties should be taken into 
consideration. 
Regardless of which system of organ transplantation is evaluated, in a 
system where the informed consent of the individuals is not ensured, the result is 
highly likely to fall short of maximum utility. From the individual’s perspective, 
for example, if the recipient does not have the full information about what is 
involved in the transplant procedure and what her other options are, she may 
agree to undergo a procedure that involves extremely high risks for great costs 
(such as transplants done in inadequate standards which have low likelihood of 
graft survival and high likelihood of donor-transmitted diseases), even though, 
given all information, she would have chosen to refuse the procedure. Moreover, 
if the recipient does not know whether the supplier is forced into giving her organ 
or whether she is fully informed about the procedure, she cannot judge whether 
accepting the organ will satisfy the supplier’s preferences or contribute to her 
overall happiness.  
From the policy perspective, one may argue that in classical utilitarianism, 
it is not relevant what the individual thinks will make her happy; what matters is 
what actually will make her happy. This paternalistic approach suggests that the 
individual may think that she will be happier when she earns $5,000 for her 
kidney but actually she will be miserable because her health will deteriorate after 
the poorly done surgery. While this approach is questionable, even for making 
such a claim, the evaluation has to take into consideration the individual’s 




made an autonomous decision to earn $5,000 under any circumstances because a 
lifesaving surgery that her child had to go through costs $5,000 and that is all that 
matters for her. 
The utilitarian calculation is based on preference satisfaction or overall 
happiness and we do not have a direct access to the information on what satisfies 
people’s preferences or what makes them happy. Therefore, the most important 
source of information is the individual’s own statement of what makes her happy 
or satisfies her desires. Individuals often fail to make accurate predictions for their 
happiness and preference satisfaction; yet, it is reasonable to assume that they are 
more likely to come close to accuracy if their decisions are fully informed, 
rational, and voluntary. Therefore, any system of organ transplantation, whether it 
is donation or sale, cannot maximize the utility unless it ensures the autonomy of 
the participants. 
This conclusion is supported by the empirical evidence on unregulated 
organ trade as opposed to a regulated system of donation. Most suppliers in organ 
trade regret their actions and report their happiness and health to be worse after 
the procedure. This can be traced to the discrepancy between what they were 
promised and what they actually received in terms of money and the standard of 
care. Suppliers usually end up with less money and worse health outcomes than 
what they agreed on. If the suppliers were fully informed about the risks and the 
benefits under given circumstances, they would have refused to sell their 
organs.192 
                                                 







 Informed consent, understood as fully informed, rational, and voluntary 
decision making, plays a very import role in the Kantian ethics. For our purposes 
here, we can simply focus on the formula of humanity, which emphasizes that 
one’s treatment of others as well as oneself must always respect the rational 
nature and never use one’s or the other’s rational nature merely as an instrument.  
Any type of organ transplantation would violate the formula of humanity 
if the informed consent of the participants were not ensured. By accepting an 
organ from the supplier who is not fully informed, rational, or voluntary, the 
recipient treats the supplier as a mere means for her survival. If the supplier has 
not made an informed, rational, and voluntary decision, by accepting her offer—
which results from coercion, manipulation, or ignorance—the recipient disregards 
the supplier’s rational capacity and aims to make use of her only as an instrument 
for her own survival. Given this, the recipient’s act of treating the supplier as a 
mere means and the supplier’s act of letting herself to be treated as a mere means 
lead them both to violate the formula of humanity. 
 In order to have individuals to accept or to provide an organ without 
violating the moral law, the informed consent of the participating individuals must 
be ensured. Otherwise, an organ sale as well as an organ donation is morally 







In Chapter 5, I used two questions to evaluate the moral status of organ 
transplantation systems: (1) Would a virtuous agent remain virtuous in this 
system? And (2) would a virtuous agent prefer one of these systems over others? 
Here, the same questions can be employed to examine the moral status of an act 
of providing or receiving an organ in a system that does not require informed 
consent. 
 To answer the first question, let us look at the recipient’s position in a 
system that does not ensure the informed consent of participants. In such a 
system, the recipient, who is motivated by her pursuit of human flourishing, 
would not know whether her act also ends up subjecting the supplier to vices such 
as injustice, cruelty, dishonesty, or selfishness. This is not to claim that the lack of 
knowledge about the decision of the supplier makes the recipient’s act vicious. 
Instead, it means that the virtuous recipient would be unable to accept the 
supplier’s offer considering that the supplier is taking a health risk and it is not 
clear whether her actions stem from a fully informed, rational, and voluntary 
decision. If the supplier is offering her kidney because of coercion or 
manipulation, the recipient, by accepting her kidney without seeking the 
supplier’s informed consent, would be taking advantage of this situation for her 
own good. Under these conditions, her acceptance of the organ without making 




When it comes to the second question—would a virtuous agent prefer one 
of these systems to others—the reply is even more straightforward. The virtue 
ethics emphasizes the importance of practical wisdom in understanding the 
situation and enabling one to employ the appropriate virtues in the right balance. 
For instance, even though courage is a virtue, this does not mean that one must be 
courageous at all times. Instead, it entails that one must be able to recognize the 
situations where one should act out of courage and be neither excessively nor 
insufficiently courageous. A system without informed consent does not favor the 
disclosure of all information and allows the individual to decide without having a 
sufficient grasp of the involved factors.  
If the supplier is coerced or manipulated into providing an organ, the 
virtuous agent would refrain from taking advantage of this situation. Without the 
requirement of informed consent, the virtuous agent lacks a full understanding of 
the situation and how her actions affect the other party. A virtuous agent would 




 Principlism has autonomy as one of its four main considerations. Along 
with nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice, respect for autonomy is one of the 
fundamental principles for a moral decision. It can be argued that a system that 
does not require the informed consent of the participants would be in conflict with 




strong case given that the theory insists that none of these principles are absolute 
and they can be overridden by other obligations. 
Let us focus on the supplier’s position in a system where the informed 
consent is not required. The first principle—namely, respect for autonomy—
suggests that the supplier’s offer of providing her kidney should be respected once 
the decision is autonomous. In a system where the supplier’s decision is not 
informed, rational, and voluntary, this principle cannot be followed.  
The principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence aim to balance the 
benefits and harms to the individual. As argued in Chapter 6, these principles 
need to be understood as including direct and indirect psychological harm and 
benefits in order to agree with organ transplantation. Once the scope is not limited 
to the direct medical benefits and harms, then the judgment of what is beneficial 
for the supplier can only be done by the supplier herself. And in order to make 
such a judgment, the supplier surely needs all the relevant information and should 
have the ability to reach a decision rationally and voluntarily. In a system where 
informed consent is not required, the harm and benefit judgment cannot be made. 
The last principle to consider is the principle of justice. This principle is 
the vaguest one, given that there are a variety of theories of justice and 
principlism does not endorse any of these theories particularly. Even though a 
case can be made for informed consent in relation to a theory of justice, the 
support of this principle need not be sought. Principlism suggests that a principle 
can be overridden for striking a balance in other obligations. Therefore, regardless 




to be a favorable relation), it can be claimed that the principlism demands a moral 
system of organ transplantation to require informed consent, given that the 
principles of respect for autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence 
affirmatively and strongly support the requirement of informed consent for 
participating in organ transplantation.  
 
II. Beyond the Basic Requirement 
 
A regulated organ market is likely to have more regulations than just a 
basic regulation. While the basic requirement for informed consent can easily be 
justified on moral grounds within all of the four ethical frameworks, there are 
various other regulatory concerns that are justified only by some of the ethical 
theories. Here, I present arguments for three regulations: (1) a common system of 
allocation of organs, (2) health insurance coverage for the purchase of organ as a 
part of the costs of transplant procedure, and (3) insurance for the supplier for 
transplantation related complications. These arguments are not conclusive given 
that they are based on some—not all—ethical theories, and agreement with these 
regulations would need to presuppose an agreement with those ethical theories.  
 
A. Common Database for Matching 
 
An organ market can employ various different methods for matching the 




result or price match. The allocation of organs can be done through private 
companies, online networks, or governmental agencies. Even though these 
methods of allocation are based on moral judgments, they are also strongly related 
to the empirical data that factors in to the moral argument. For example, 
allocating the organs to provide the best result can be controversial even though it 
is justified on utilitarian grounds. If there is a great lack of organs, in such a 
system many patients, who have been on a dialysis for a while or who have other 
health conditions, would be left to die even though they can benefit greatly from 
the organ transplantation. This can give rise to issues about justice and value of 
individuals. On the other hand, if the supply meets the demand, then the ‘best 
result’ rule becomes uncontroversial and simply efficient.  
The allocation methods are open for discussion, yet a less controversial 
regulatory point is related to a more basic issue in matching. The outcome of the 
organ transplantation is strongly dependent on how good the match is.193 
Therefore, whether or not there are enough organs to meet the needs of the 
patients, it can be argued that the information pool for matching these organs with 
the donors should be sufficiently large in order to find the best matches.  
This regulatory suggestion does not necessarily argue for a monopsony. It 
only argues against small clusters of information that are not used in 
collaboration. In other words, under such a regulatory rule, many small private 
companies that do organ matching can exist as long as they cooperate with each 
other by sharing their databases to find the best match for the patient in the 
shortest time. This also does not necessarily mean that all such companies should 
                                                 




collaborate; instead, it only points out to the need for a large enough information 
network to provide the best and fastest matches. 
This regulatory rule can be justified most strongly by a utilitarian 
framework. By finding the best and fastest matches, not only is the health 
outcome of the procedure optimized, but the recipient is also saved from having a 
low quality of life while being treated by medications and dialysis. On the other 
hand, this regulation can also be supported by principlism with an appeal to 
justice and beneficence. In a system with a common database for matching 
suppliers with recipients, best matches can be found for most recipients without 
having to choose between them on irrelevant grounds such as their exact second 
of entering the waiting list. 
 
B. Insurance Coverage for Organ Purchase 
 
Health insurance is an issue that is mainly discussed in relation to the 
justice in distribution of health care. Here, I will not discuss this issue but focus 
on a sub-question. Currently, many types of health insurance cover the costs of 
dialysis and organ transplantation. Both of these treatments are highly costly and 
in many cases, the patients are not lucky enough to avoid dialysis whether or not 
they receive an organ in the end. I argue that a regulation should require such 
health insurances to also cover the costs of purchasing an organ. This would allow 




transplantation instead of being dependent on their extra funds to pay for the 
organ.  
One may argue that such a regulation does not provide more just 
conditions for the society, given that those who can afford such health insurances 
will be the better off, and the worse off will still suffer since they most likely do 
not even have any health insurance. This objection mainly attacks the lack of 
universal health insurance, which is a different problem. However, if we assume 
the existing health insurance distribution as a given, then by not covering the 
purchase of the organ, the system creates even more inequality between the 
patients who can just afford a health insurance and patients who can afford both 
health insurance and the cost of buying an organ.  
From a utilitarian perspective, this regulation is also supported. Studies 
comparing the costs of kidney transplant and dialysis found that the “break even” 
point is at about 2.7 years after the transplantation for most patients and 1.7 years 
for the approximately 30% of patients who do not need readmission. After the 
break even point, the transplant patient saves about $28,000 per year.194 As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the cost of buying a kidney is calculated to be around 
$15,200.195 By enabling a better treatment for a lower cost, such a system 
increases the happiness and preference satisfaction of the patients with kidney 
failure without taking the funds from other sources.  
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C. Insurance for Transplantation Related Complications for the Supplier 
 
 The non-incentivized systems, in their quest for increasing the supply of 
organs, aim at incorporating policies that remove disincentives. For this purpose, 
a system of comprehensive reimbursement can be designed to include follow-up 
care for the supplier up to a limited time or for specific conditions.196 An organ 
market is mainly based on monetary transaction instead of compensations such as 
insurance or tax reduction. However, it can be argued that an insurance for the 
supplier for transplantation related complications should be provided even in an 
organ market that operates with money and not with compensation.  
 By accepting this regulation, the policy makes the suppliers receive a 
smaller sum of money plus insurance for transplantation-related matters instead of 
getting a larger sum of money only. Such a policy can be justified within the 
frameworks of principlism and virtue ethics. From the perspective of principlism, 
it can be argued that such a regulation is in line with the principles of 
nonmaleficence and beneficence. By ensuring post-operative care for the supplier, 
the system minimizes the harm that can come to the patient while preserving her 
financial benefits. It thus creates a better balance of harm and benefits. 
This idea can be objected by referring to the principle of respect for 
autonomy, which would find it disagreeable if the patient does not have a choice 
of foregoing the insurance for a larger sum of money. Given principlism’s lack of 
method for balancing principles, it is not clear how strong such an objection is. As 
                                                 





the theory suggests, a principle can be overridden for the sake of other principles; 
in this case, principles of nonmaleficence and beneficence may outweigh the 
principle of respect for autonomy. 
 Another justification for this regulation can be based on virtue ethics. If 
the regulation asserts that the insurance for the supplier has to be provided by the 
institute that performs the transplantation surgery, then this system would 
reinforce a sense of responsibility to the health care staff. A virtuous person 
would be likely to prefer such a system given that it would minimize vices against 
the supplier such as cruelty, dishonesty, inconsideration, greed, recklessness, and 
thoughtlessness. 
 
III. Evaluation of International Guidelines 
 
Recognizing the problems with organ trade, both governments and 
international bodies strive towards preventing the occurrence of it. In their 
struggle to fight against the organ trade, they argue and act against any type of 
incentivized system of organ transplantation and especially an organ market. 
There are two problems with the justification of such a strategy: (1) The 
arguments against incentives and commercialization are based on characteristics 
that are unique to an unregulated system such as organ trade, and (2) these 
arguments applied to a regulated organ market lack any ethical basis.  
As shown in Chapter 2, organ trade differs from organ market in terms of 




requirement of informed consent. Given this distinction, any argument against 
organ trade can only be valid against organ market if it does not rely on the 
unregulated character of the trade. Furthermore, since these arguments object to 
an incentivized or commercial system for reasons of morality, there must be 
ethical justifications for such arguments. However, I argue that none of the 
guidelines bring out such a justification, and it is not clear how there can be an 
ethical ground for these objections.  
 
A. The Declaration of Istanbul 
 
In 2008, “The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and 
Transplant Tourism” was endorsed worldwide by transplantation societies, 
including national councils and the Council of Europe.197 The Declaration aims to 
fight against organ trade and to reinforce the principles to ensure the well-being of 
suppliers and recipients of organs. Principle 6 in the Declaration states,  
Organ trafficking and transplant tourism violate the principles of equity, 
justice, and respect for human dignity and should be prohibited. Because 
transplant commercialism targets impoverished and otherwise vulnerable 
donors, it leads inexorably to inequity and injustice and should be prohibited. 
In Resolution 44.25, the World Health Assembly called on countries to 
prevent the purchase and sale of human organs for transplantation. 
a. Prohibitions on these practices should include a ban on all types of 
advertising (including electronic and print media), soliciting, or brokering for 
the purpose of transplant commercialism, organ trafficking, or transplant 
tourism. 
                                                 
197 “Endorsing Organizations,” The Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking and Transplant 






b. Such prohibitions should also include penalties for acts, such as medically 
screening donors or organs, or transplanting organs, that aid, encourage, or 
use the products of, organ trafficking or transplant tourism. 
c. Practices that induce vulnerable individuals or groups (such as illiterate and 
impoverished persons, undocumented immigrants, prisoners, and political or 
economic refugees) to become living donors are incompatible with the aim of 
combating organ trafficking, transplant tourism, and transplant 
commercialism.198  
 
Given the definitions, organ trafficking and transplant tourism fall under the 
category of illegal organ trade, whereas transplant commercialism includes both 
organ market and organ trade.  
While the characteristics of organ trade can be used in order to flesh out 
the arguments based on equity, justice, and dignity, it is not clear how the same 
arguments can be transported to the discussion of organ market. In an unregulated 
organ trade, the suppliers are misinformed, manipulated, and deceived with false 
promises. They unknowingly confirm to an agreement that is to their disadvantage 
and in many cases, they do not even receive what the agreement promises. Hence, 
it is clear why the organ trade can be labeled as unjust and undignified, since it 
prevents the supplier from acting as a rational, autonomous agent.199  
On the other hand, it is not clear how transplant commercialism or an 
organ market leads to injustice. As discussed in Part II, the regulated organ 
market where all participants are fully informed, rational, and voluntary, both 
from the perspectives of virtue ethics and principlism, provides a better system in 
terms of justice than donation only. Moreover, as discussed at length in Chapter 4, 
there is certainly no violation of human dignity if the term is understood in a 
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Kantian way. And finally, as the argument from vulnerability concludes in 
Chapter 2, as well as the understanding of competency for decision making, 
autonomous behavior, and undue inducement in the framework of principlism 
shows, an organ market does not exploit or take advantage of the vulnerable 
populations.  
The Declaration of Istanbul fails to make a case for condemning 
commercialization of organ transplantation. Since organ trade has obvious 
problems, the justification for the Declaration’s position against organ trade is 
straightforward. But precisely because the Declaration’s justification relies 
entirely on these obvious problems of organ trade, it is not valid against the organ 
market, which does not have these same problems. The Declaration overlooks the 
crucial differences between the organ trade and the organ market, and does not 
attempt to provide a relevant connection between the two practices in order to 
make its objection against the market defensible.  
 
B. WHO Guiding Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation 
 
In 2010, the WHO announced the updated version of “WHO Guiding 
Principles on Human Cell, Tissue and Organ Transplantation.” These principles 
are “intended to provide an orderly, ethical and acceptable framework for the 
acquisition and transplantation of human cells, tissues and organs for therapeutic 
purposes.”200 Similar to the Declaration of Istanbul, the WHO Guiding Principles 
also prohibit the commercialization of organ transplantation. Guiding Principle 5 
                                                 




states that “[c]ells, tissues and organs should only be donated freely, without any 
monetary payment or other reward of monetary value. Purchasing, or offering to 
purchase, cells, tissues or organs for transplantation, or their sale by living 
persons or by the next of kin for deceased persons, should be banned.”201 In the 
commentary added to Guiding Principle 5, it is clearly stated that the WHO takes 
a firm position against transplant commercialism by claiming that “[p]ayment for 
cells, tissues and organs is likely to take unfair advantage of the poorest and most 
vulnerable groups, undermines altruistic donation, and leads to profiteering and 
human trafficking. Such payment conveys the idea that some persons lack dignity, 
that they are mere objects to be used by others.”202  
The same problem that occurs in the Declaration is repeated in the WHO 
Guiding Principles. While the condemnation of organ trade is understandable for 
the reasons that are explicitly mentioned in the commentary, the claim of 
commercialization necessarily leading to the same results, such as taking 
advantage of the poor and causing human trafficking, is not supported. For all we 
can claim given the existing evidence is that the lack of organs in the limitations 
of the system of donation is what gives rise to the organ trade and trafficking. 
Given the lack of justification why commercialism is likely to result in the 
exploitation of the vulnerable and the trafficking of humans, Guiding Principle 5 
has no valid argument against an organ market. 
In addition to this unsupported connection that is drawn between 
unregulated organ trade and regulated organ market, a reference to dignity is 






provided. This objection, echoing the Kantian formula of humanity, is valid 
within the illegal and deceptive nature of organ trade. Yet, as I have shown in 
Chapter 4, it loses all of its relevance when applied to a regulated organ market 
with informed, voluntary, and rational individuals.203 
 The WHO Guiding Principle 3 states that “[l]ive donors should be 
informed of the probable risks, benefits and consequences of donation in a 
complete and understandable fashion; they should be legally competent and 
capable of weighing the information; and they should be acting willingly, free of 
any undue influence or coercion.”204 A proposed organ market also has to follow 
these criteria for the eligibility of living organ suppliers. These criteria are as 
crucial in an organ market as they are in a system of donation given that the 
emotional attachment of the supplier to the recipient certainly does not guarantee 
her competency for decision making or her voluntariness. Familial or social 
dynamics may give rise to the related donor’s involuntary acceptance of giving 
her organ, and the system of donation has to have the necessary safeguards in 
order to prevent this. Similarly, a system of commercialization may include those 
individuals who involuntarily agree to provide their organs because of coercion. 
An organ market should also prevent this from happening by using safeguards and 
protocols that aim to eliminate such individuals. The important aspect of this 
guiding principle is that it is relevant to any regulated system of organ 
transplantation and does not straightforwardly object to a system of 
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commercialization since these criteria for living suppliers can be and should be 
fulfilled in such a system. 
Considering that these guidelines fail to provide a justification for an 
objection to a regulated organ market and simply rely on arguments relevant to 
organ trade, it becomes unclear why an ethical system of organ transplantation 
must avoid incentives and commercial transaction. The existing guidelines are 
justified in their fight against the organ trade and practices that are entailed by 
organ trade such as trafficking and transplant tourism. Yet, if these guidelines aim 
to object any system of commercialization, then they first have to argue for the 
relevant connection between organ trade and organ market and then provide a 
moral justification for an objection. However, I argue that such a position is not 
defendable given the analysis that I have provided in Part II. A regulated organ 
market encounters no objections from four main ethical theories. By contrast, 
given that a prohibition proves to be ethically unjustified and even wrong, it is 
more likely that once these guidelines spell out their arguments, they will violate 
the demands of these ethical theories. 
 These policies and guidelines insist on the idea that making an organ 
available must be an act of generosity only and cannot be reciprocated. It is 
difficult to understand this position since in daily life, we do not expect people to 
act heroically, take risks, and endure pain in order to help others. Making an 
organ available is not a common action that can be expected from everyone given 
that it carries no benefits for the self and it requires risk and pain. Such an act is 




extremely low numbers of non-related non-directed altruistic living organ 
donations confirms this understanding. Most of our actions and decisions take into 
consideration the economic benefits of available choices, and our understanding 
of heroic acts typically finds it appropriate to reciprocate the hero’s ‘good’ act 
with a reward. However, there is an interesting conservatism when it comes to 
organ transplantation. An act that involves no material benefits or rewards is 
expected from the supplier. Unsurprisingly, this expectation results in an 
extremely low number of living anonymous donations. Current guidelines and 
policies find it reasonable to reimburse the suppliers for their financial loss, such 
as the time they have to take off from their work; and even compensate them for 
the risks by providing free medical care for transplantation-related problems. Yet, 
it becomes highly controversial to ‘compensate’ them for their real permanent 
loss—their organs. The opponents base their arguments on morality; yet, there is 
no moral justification for their positions. Most importantly, this discussion 
continues at the expense of the death of 11,000 people per year only in the United 
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